

Monthly — June 14, 2024

U.S. Economic Outlook: June 2024

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
Back on the Road to 2%

- We remain confident that the FOMC will begin reducing the federal funds rate before the year is out. Our base case looks for two 25 bps rate cuts, one at each of the September and December meetings. That said, it will be a close call between one or two 25 bps cuts this year.
- The path back to 2% inflation is coming into better focus. Core inflation eased for the second consecutive month in May according to the CPI, posting the smallest monthly increase since August 2021. Fed Chair Powell acknowledged this progress but stated that the committee needs to see several more benign prints before it begins easing.
- We expect core inflation to remain on a slow downward trajectory. Our current projections have the core PCE deflator averaging monthly increases of around 0.2% for the remainder of the year, versus an average 0.3% in the first four months of 2024.
- The labor market does not appear to be rapidly deteriorating. Job gains remain quite robust according to the BLS establishment survey. Meanwhile, indicators of labor demand and rising unemployment in the household survey suggest that the labor market is gradually reverting to its pre-pandemic state.
- We maintain our view that economic growth will proceed below trend this year as the lagged effects of monetary tightening bite harder. Evidence points to consumers growing weary of high interest expense and prioritizing essentials over recreation. Higher rates also continue to constrain industrial production, construction and land development, setting the stage for more modest nonresidential investment in the year ahead.


September Still in Play

The path back to 2% inflation is coming into better focus. Inflation prints have trended in the right direction since the release of our May economic outlook, reinforcing our view that Q1's uptick in price pressures was only a flare up. Chair Powell gave a nod to this progress at the June Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) press conference. Although he acknowledged that recent inflation readings have been more favorable than first quarter data, he maintained that the committee needs to see several more benign prints before gaining enough confidence to begin easing.

The May Consumer Price Index (CPI) was an encouraging step toward that end. Core inflation eased for the second month in a row, posting the smallest monthly increase since August 2021. Importantly for the FOMC, services prices slowed sharply, indicating a more broad-based easing in inflation. Core non-housing services (aka, "super-core" inflation) registered its first monthly decrease since September 2021. Although the anticipated slowdown in shelter has yet to fully materialize, private rent measures still foreshadow a further moderation in shelter inflation coming down the pipeline. Our current projections for core inflation have monthly prints remaining on a slow downward trajectory through year-end, even as unfavorable base effects are apt to keep year-over-year readings elevated. We estimate the Fed's preferred inflation gauge, the core Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) deflator, will average monthly readings of around 0.2% for the remainder of the year versus an average 0.3% in the first four months of 2024.



Source: U.S. Department of Labor and Wells Fargo Economics




Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and Wells Fargo Economics


Chair Powell acknowledged that the committee could be prompted to begin easing if it sees a rapid deterioration in labor market conditions. So far, that does not appear to be the case. The data continue to support a still-sturdy labor market that is reverting to its pre-pandemic state. Job gains remain robust according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) establishment survey. Not only did May's payroll print blow past expectations and surpass the Q1 average monthly gain, but it was also the second-highest reading this year. That noted, the separately conducted BLS household survey suggested the labor market continues to gradually soften, with the unemployment rate rising to 4.0%. Although still historically low, this marked the highest reading in 29 months. As such, we have taken up our forecasts for both nonfarm payrolls and the unemployment rate, reflecting a growing [divide](#) between these two staple surveys.

Putting top-line nonfarm payrolls aside, a chorus of other indicators show labor demand downshifting from the record levels registered over the past few years. The downward trend in job openings remains firmly in place whether signaled by the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) or private sector measures. As hiring cools, the ratio of job openings to unemployed has nearly returned to its pre-pandemic level. Perceptions of job availability have deteriorated in turn. The share of consumers viewing jobs as "plentiful" in the Consumer Confidence survey is at its lowest level since early 2018, excluding the initial onset of the pandemic. We suspect that these indicators are catching on to something that the establishment survey is missing. The most recent Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) suggests substantial downward revisions to nonfarm

employment through December 2023 that are likely to be evident in the BLS's preliminary benchmark announcement in August.



Source: U.S. Department of Labor, NFIB and Wells Fargo Economics



Source: U.S. Department of Labor and Wells Fargo Economics

We maintain our view that economic growth will proceed below trend this year as the lagged effects of monetary tightening bite harder. Although the economy remains healthy on balance, we have brought down our forecast for real GDP growth in Q2 after a weaker-than-expected start to the quarter. Slumping goods spending in April pulled real personal outlays into the red, suggesting that consumers are growing weary of high interest expense. Although services spending remains solid, evidence is mounting that consumers are becoming more reserved as they prioritize essential purchases like housing and healthcare over recreation. Meanwhile, higher interest rates continue to constrain industrial production, construction and land development, setting the stage for more modest nonresidential investment in the year ahead.

We remain confident that the FOMC will begin reducing the federal funds rate before the year is out. Our base case looks for two 25 bps rate cuts this year, one at each of the September and December meetings. Although the median dot in the Fed's Summary of Economic Projections in June projected just one rate cut by year-end, participants were fairly evenly distributed with seven penciling in one cut, eight penciling in two and four participants looking for no cuts at all. It will be a close call come September. Like the Fed, we will remain in wait-and-see mode, watching for a revival in economic momentum or price pressures that would prompt us to push back our call to just one rate cut by year's end.

U.S. Forecast Table

Wells Fargo U.S. Economic Forecast																				
	Actual								Forecast								Actual		Forecast	
	2022				2023				2024				2025				2022	2023	2024	2025
	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q				
Real Gross Domestic Product (a)	-2.0	-0.6	2.7	2.6	2.2	2.1	4.9	3.4	1.3	1.9	1.8	1.5	1.8	2.1	2.4	2.4	1.9	2.5	2.3	1.9
Personal Consumption	0.0	2.0	1.6	1.2	3.8	0.8	3.1	3.3	2.0	1.9	1.6	1.7	1.7	1.9	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.2	2.2	1.8
Business Fixed Investment	10.7	5.3	4.7	1.7	5.7	7.4	1.4	3.7	3.3	3.5	1.3	1.6	3.0	5.0	6.9	6.3	5.2	4.5	3.1	3.6
Equipment	16.8	4.9	5.6	-5.0	-4.1	7.7	-4.4	-1.1	0.3	5.1	2.0	2.7	4.3	5.6	8.8	5.7	5.2	-0.3	1.1	4.7
Intellectual Property Products	11.4	8.7	7.1	6.1	3.8	2.7	1.8	4.3	7.9	5.3	3.0	2.5	3.8	5.6	6.9	7.6	9.1	4.5	4.7	4.5
Structures	-1.2	-0.5	-1.3	6.5	30.3	16.1	11.2	10.9	0.4	-3.4	-3.8	-2.6	-1.6	2.4	3.2	4.5	-2.1	13.2	3.0	-0.5
Residential Investment	-1.8	-14.1	-26.4	-24.9	-5.3	-2.2	6.7	2.8	15.4	-2.7	-1.8	2.1	3.4	4.5	4.9	5.5	-9.0	-10.6	4.3	2.6
Government Purchases	-2.9	-1.9	2.9	5.3	4.8	3.3	5.8	4.6	1.3	2.3	1.7	1.4	1.3	1.1	1.1	0.8	-0.9	4.1	2.8	1.3
Net Exports	-1141.1	-1116.2	-981.2	-965.6	-935.1	-928.2	-930.7	-918.5	-975.3	-1009.3	-1006.2	-1005.8	-1015.4	-1037.7	-1066.2	-1093.0	-1051.0	-928.1	-999.2	-1053.1
Pct. Point Contribution to GDP	-2.6	0.6	2.6	0.3	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.3	-0.9	-0.6	0.1	0.0	-0.2	-0.4	-0.5	-0.5	-0.5	0.6	-0.3	-0.2
Inventory Change	197.0	92.7	70.7	151.9	27.2	14.9	77.8	54.9	27.8	49.2	61.0	51.1	51.1	59.0	61.0	64.9	128.1	43.7	47.3	59.0
Pct. Point Contribution to GDP	-0.1	-2.1	-0.7	1.6	-2.2	0.0	1.3	-0.5	-0.5	0.4	0.2	-0.2	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.5	-0.4	0.0	0.1
Nominal GDP (a)	6.2	8.5	7.2	6.5	6.3	3.8	8.3	5.1	4.3	4.7	3.8	3.8	4.3	4.3	4.5	4.6	9.1	6.3	4.9	4.2
Real Final Sales	-1.9	1.5	3.4	0.9	4.6	2.1	3.6	3.9	1.7	1.5	1.6	1.7	1.8	2.0	2.4	2.4	1.3	2.9	2.5	1.9
Retail Sales (b)	12.4	8.6	9.2	6.4	5.1	1.8	3.4	4.0	2.0	2.9	1.6	0.9	1.4	1.1	1.4	1.8	9.1	3.6	1.9	1.4
Inflation Indicators (b)																				
PCE Deflator	6.6	6.8	6.6	5.9	5.0	3.9	3.3	2.8	2.5	2.6	2.4	2.6	2.4	2.2	2.2	2.2	6.5	3.7	2.5	2.2
"Core" PCE Deflator	5.5	5.2	5.2	5.1	4.8	4.6	3.8	3.2	2.8	2.7	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.3	5.2	4.1	2.8	2.4
Consumer Price Index	8.0	8.6	8.3	7.1	5.7	4.0	3.6	3.2	3.2	3.3	3.0	3.0	2.8	2.6	2.6	2.4	8.0	4.1	3.1	2.6
"Core" Consumer Price Index	6.3	6.0	6.3	6.0	5.5	5.2	4.4	4.0	3.8	3.5	3.5	3.5	3.1	3.0	2.9	2.8	6.2	4.8	3.6	2.9
Producer Price Index (Final Demand)	10.8	11.0	8.9	7.3	4.4	1.3	1.6	1.0	1.5	2.3	1.6	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.2	2.1	9.5	2.0	1.9	2.1
Employment Cost Index	4.5	5.1	5.0	5.1	4.8	4.5	4.3	4.2	4.2	4.1	4.0	4.0	3.8	3.7	3.6	3.6	4.9	4.5	4.1	3.6
Real Disposable Income (a)	-9.8	-1.4	3.6	2.2	10.8	3.3	0.5	0.9	1.9	0.9	2.1	2.6	2.8	2.1	2.3	2.6	-6.0	4.1	1.5	2.4
Nominal Personal Income (a)	2.4	4.7	6.8	4.7	6.8	4.0	3.9	2.8	7.1	4.2	4.1	4.9	5.3	4.3	4.3	4.7	2.0	5.1	4.7	4.7
Industrial Production (a)	3.7	4.1	2.1	-2.5	-0.3	0.8	1.6	-2.0	-1.1	1.7	1.5	2.7	3.1	2.2	2.8	4.2	3.4	0.2	0.3	2.6
Capacity Utilization	80.0	80.6	80.8	79.9	79.6	79.4	79.4	78.8	78.3	78.4	78.7	79.2	79.7	79.9	80.2	80.8	80.3	79.3	78.7	80.1
Corporate Profits Before Taxes (b)	10.0	9.1	11.5	8.6	4.6	-2.7	-0.6	5.1	7.2	4.5	3.0	1.0	2.0	4.0	4.0	2.5	9.8	1.5	3.9	3.1
Corporate Profits After Taxes	4.0	4.5	7.9	7.1	3.6	-4.1	-2.1	3.8	6.4	4.3	2.5	0.6	2.6	3.9	3.9	2.5	5.9	0.2	3.4	3.2
Federal Budget Balance (c)	-291	153	-860	-421	-680	-292	-302	-510	-555	-214	-421	-498	-702	-214	-385	-525	-1375	-1695	-1700	-1800
Trade Weighted Dollar Index (d)	109.6	114.7	121.4	116.5	116.2	114.7	117.0	114.6	115.8	117.8	119.3	118.0	117.0	115.3	113.5	112.5	115.1	115.4	117.7	114.6
Nonfarm Payroll Change (e)	536	326	396	252	305	274	213	212	267	212	195	153	125	122	132	138	377	251	207	129
Unemployment Rate	3.8	3.6	3.5	3.6	3.5	3.6	3.7	3.7	3.8	3.9	4.0	4.1	4.2	4.1	4.0	3.9	3.6	3.6	3.9	4.0
Housing Starts (f)	1.71	1.64	1.46	1.40	1.37	1.46	1.38	1.48	1.40	1.39	1.45	1.48	1.47	1.47	1.48	1.49	1.55	1.42	1.43	1.48
Light Vehicle Sales (g)	13.9	13.4	13.6	14.2	15.0	15.8	15.7	15.7	15.3	15.8	15.5	15.6	16.0	16.2	16.5	16.8	13.8	15.5	15.6	16.4
Crude Oil - Brent - Front Contract (h)	95.7	109.8	95.5	87.9	81.9	77.6	85.3	82.3	81.2	81.3	82.0	80.7	81.7	81.3	80.3	79.0	97.2	81.8	81.3	80.6
Quarter-End Interest Rates (i)																				
Federal Funds Target Rate (j)	0.50	1.75	3.25	4.50	5.00	5.25	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.50	5.25	5.00	4.75	4.50	4.25	4.00	2.02	5.23	5.31	4.38
Secured Overnight Financing Rate	0.29	1.50	2.98	4.30	4.87	5.09	5.31	5.38	5.34	5.35	5.15	4.90	4.65	4.40	4.15	3.90	1.64	5.01	5.19	4.28
Prime Rate	3.50	4.75	6.25	7.50	8.00	8.25	8.50	8.50	8.50	8.50	8.25	8.00	7.75	7.50	7.25	7.00	5.02	8.23	8.31	7.38
Conventional Mortgage Rate	4.27	5.58	6.01	6.36	6.54	6.71	7.20	6.82	6.82	7.00	6.75	6.50	6.30	6.15	6.00	5.90	5.38	6.80	6.77	6.09
3 Month Bill	0.52	1.72	3.33	4.42	4.85	5.43	5.55	5.40	5.46	5.35	5.10	4.85	4.60	4.35	4.10	3.85	2.09	5.28	5.19	4.23
6 Month Bill	1.06	2.51	3.92	4.76	4.94	5.47	5.53	5.26	5.38	5.30	4.95	4.70	4.45	4.20	3.95	3.70	2.51	5.28	5.08	4.08
1 Year Bill	1.63	2.80	4.05	4.73	4.64	5.40	5.46	4.79	5.03	5.10	4.70	4.45	4.20	3.95	3.70	3.50	2.80	5.08	4.82	3.84
2 Year Note	2.28	2.92	4.22	4.41	4.06	4.87	5.03	4.23	4.59	4.75	4.35	4.05	3.85	3.70	3.55	3.45	2.99	4.58	4.44	3.64
5 Year Note	2.42	3.01	4.06	3.99	3.60	4.13	4.60	3.84	4.21	4.35	4.10	3.90	3.80	3.70	3.65	3.60	3.00	4.06	4.14	3.69
10 Year Note	2.32	2.98	3.83	3.88	3.48	3.81	4.59	3.88	4.20	4.35	4.15	4.00	3.90	3.85	3.80	3.75	2.95	3.96	4.18	3.83
30 Year Bond	2.44	3.14	3.79	3.97	3.67	3.85	4.73	4.03	4.34	4.50	4.35	4.25	4.15	4.10	4.05	4.00	3.11	4.09	4.36	4.08

Forecast as of: June 14, 2024

Notes: (a) Compound Annual Growth Rate Quarter-over-Quarter

(b) Year-over-Year Percentage Change

(c) Quarterly Sum - Billions USD; Annual Data Represents Fiscal Year

(d) Federal Reserve Advanced Foreign Economies Index, 2006=100 - Quarter End

(e) Average Monthly Change

(f) Quarterly Data - Average Monthly SAAR; Annual Data - Actual Total Houses Started

(g) Quarterly Data - Average Monthly SAAR; Annual Data - Actual Total Vehicles Sold

(h) Quarterly Average of Daily Close

(i) Quarterly Data - Period End; Annual Data - Annual Averages

(j) Upper Bound of the Federal Funds Target Range

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Department of Labor, IHS Markit, Federal Reserve Board and Wells Fargo Economics

Forecast Delta Table

Changes to the Wells Fargo U.S. Economic Forecast																				
	Actual								Forecast								Actual		Forecast	
	2022				2023				2024				2025				2022	2023	2024	2025
	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q				
Real Gross Domestic Product (a)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.34	-0.79	-0.10	0.04	-0.03	0.12	-0.05	0.08	0.00	0.00	-0.25	-0.04
Personal Consumption	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.51	-1.17	-0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.35	-0.08
Business Fixed Investment	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.41	1.66	0.44	0.11	-0.46	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.48	0.07
Equipment	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.85	2.45	0.00	0.00	-1.25	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.16
Intellectual Property Products	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.50	1.76	1.02	0.25	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.09	0.28
Structures	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.51	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.13	0.00
Residential Investment	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.52	-6.40	-3.90	0.60	0.30	0.20	0.10	0.10	0.00	0.00	-1.38	-0.67
Government Purchases	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.15	0.00	0.10	0.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.03
Net Exports	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-2.2	-10.7	-12.9	-10.6	-6.0	-3.4	-3.5	1.7	0.0	0.0	-9.1	-2.8
Pct. Point Contribution to GDP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.03	-0.15	-0.04	0.04	0.08	0.04	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.00	-0.04	0.03
Inventory Change	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	-7.6	0.1	0.1	-2.8	-5.8	-1.8	-4.8	-5.7	0.0	0.0	-2.6	-4.5
Pct. Point Contribution to GDP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.10	0.14	0.00	-0.05	-0.05	0.07	-0.05	-0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01
Nominal GDP	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.42	-1.14	-0.12	0.28	0.05	0.14	-0.04	0.10	0.00	0.00	-0.32	0.01
Real Final Sales	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.24	-0.93	-0.10	0.09	0.02	0.06	0.00	0.10	0.00	0.00	-0.24	-0.03
Retail Sales (b)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.09	0.00	0.00	-0.25	-0.73	-0.91	-1.24	-1.15	-0.74	-0.47	-0.14	0.00	0.03	-0.78	-0.62
Inflation Indicators (b)																				
PCE Deflator	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.02	-0.10	-0.10	-0.04	0.00	0.08	0.08	0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.06	0.05
"Core" PCE Deflator	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.02	0.01	0.04	0.07	0.10	0.07	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.05
Consumer Price Index	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.23	-0.28	-0.19	-0.14	0.11	0.17	0.09	0.00	0.00	-0.17	0.06
"Core" Consumer Price Index	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.08	-0.08	-0.03	0.01	0.11	0.13	0.09	0.00	0.00	-0.05	0.08
Producer Price Index (Final Demand)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.05	-0.18	-0.37	-0.38	-0.33	-0.19	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.24	-0.13
Employment Cost Index	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Real Disposable Income (a)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.10	0.87	-0.16	0.30	-0.05	-0.05	-0.06	0.12	0.21	0.00	-0.07	0.02	0.02
Nominal Personal Income (a)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.21	-0.03	-0.06	0.29	0.19	0.04	-0.05	0.13	0.23	0.00	-0.08	-0.20	0.10
Industrial Production (a)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.09	0.68	0.75	0.27	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.33	0.08
Capacity Utilization	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.02	0.12	0.16	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.00	0.00	0.18	0.22
Corporate Profits Before Taxes (b)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3.20	2.50	2.80	3.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.88	0.00
Corporate Profits After Taxes	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2.09	2.22	2.46	2.59	0.55	-0.12	-0.08	-0.02	0.00	0.00	2.35	0.08
Federal Budget Balance (c)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.10	-89.47	-60.43	0.09	0.33	-0.37	-0.05	0.07	0.00	0.00	-150.00	0.00
Trade Weighted Dollar Index (d)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.75	-1.25	-1.25	-1.25	-1.00	-1.00	-1.00	0.00	0.00	-1.06	-1.06
Nonfarm Payroll Change (e)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.67	30.67	41.67	38.33	13.33	-5.00	-1.67	-5.00	0.00	0.00	27.25	0.42
Unemployment Rate	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.06	0.05	-0.02	0.11	0.05	0.04	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.05
Housing Starts (f)	-0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00
Light Vehicle Sales (g)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.06	0.26	0.12	0.16	0.10	-0.23	-0.23	-0.37	0.00	0.00	0.12	-0.18
Crude Oil - Brent - Front Contract (h)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-4.04	-3.33	-2.00	-0.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-2.34	-0.08
Quarter-End Interest Rates (i)																				
Federal Funds Target Rate	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Secured Overnight Financing Rate	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Prime Rate	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Conventional Mortgage Rate	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.05	-0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.00
3 Month Bill	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
6 Month Bill	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1 Year Bill	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00
2 Year Note	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.05	-0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.00
5 Year Note	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.10	-0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.04	0.00
10 Year Note	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.05	-0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.02	0.00
30 Year Bond	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	-0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.04	-0.01

Forecast as of: June 14, 2024

Notes: (a) Compound Annual Growth Rate Quarter-over-Quarter

(b) Year-over-Year Percentage Change

(c) Quarterly Sum - Billions USD; Annual Data Represents Fiscal Year

(d) Federal Reserve Advanced Foreign Economies Index, 2006=100 - Quarter End

(e) Average Monthly Change

(f) Quarterly Data - Average Monthly SAAR; Annual Data - Actual Total Houses Started

(g) Quarterly Data - Average Monthly SAAR; Annual Data - Actual Total Vehicles Sold

(h) Quarterly Average of Daily Close

(i) Quarterly Data - Period End; Annual Data - Annual Averages

(j) Upper Bound of the Federal Funds Target Range

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Department of Labor, IHS Markit, Federal Reserve Board and Wells Fargo Economics

Personal Consumption Expenditures

- Revisions to first quarter GDP took the headline growth rate down to 1.3% from 1.6% previously, with a sharply lower profile for consumer goods spending accounting for most of the adjustment.
- The newly revised annualized growth rate for real consumer spending in Q1-2024 is now just 2.0% versus 2.5% in the initial estimate. Services outlays were more or less unchanged, but goods spending is now estimated to have contracted at an 1.9% annualized rate in Q1.
- We have lowered our Q2 estimate for consumer spending growth to 1.9%, down from 3.0% previously. The forecast for the second half of 2024 and all of 2025 is unchanged from last month.


Despite a clear contraction in goods spending, the continued resilience in services outlays remains problematic for the Federal Reserve's efforts to bring down the inflation rate in the service sector. That said, diminished demand for goods points to a weakening backdrop for the consumer. Sentiment and confidence gauges have been iffy at best, consumers are lowering their saving rate to sustain spending and rising delinquencies point to a greater struggle for households. The long and variable lag of monetary policy at long last appears to be evident in consumer behavior.

Investment: Equipment, Intellectual Property Products and Inventories

- A downward revision to equipment spending and a sharp upward revision to intellectual property outlays culminated in a net upward revision to Q1 real business fixed investment (BFI), which grew at a 3.3% annualized clip in Q1, up from the first estimate of 2.9%.
- We have lifted our Q3 BFI forecast slightly but still anticipate sub-2% growth in the second half of 2024 before capital spending picks up steam as capital costs come down in our forecast for next year.
- Inventories lopped off roughly half a percentage point from headline growth in each of the past two quarters; our baseline expectation is for only modest inventory investment for the foreseeable future.


The latest GDP revisions did reveal that growth in equipment outlays slowed to a crawl in Q1, but overall business fixed investment was actually stronger and boosted the headline by more than a full percentage point. Intellectual property outlays shot up at a 7.9% annualized rate in the first quarter, the fastest growth in a year and a half. We look for soft BFI spending in the second half of 2024 before a measured increase in capital outlays in 2025.

Real Personal Consumption Expenditures



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and Wells Fargo Economics

Real Equipment Investment



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and Wells Fargo Economics

Investment: Residential


- We have adjusted down our near-term expectations for residential spending. Higher mortgage rates continue to constrain the residential sector, evidenced by weaker-than-expected residential construction spending and home sales. A slip in single-family construction activity suggests further weakness in coming quarters, although rate cuts should foster a stronger pace of growth further out on the forecast horizon.

Familiar headwinds are picking back up for the residential sector. The housing market enjoyed a brief rebound to start the year as residential investment strengthened in Q1 with the help of a lull in mortgage rates. Resurgent mortgage rates, however, have poured water on the fledgling residential rebound. The 30-year fixed mortgage rate averaged 7% in April and May, dampening buyer demand and sending home sales lower in April. Weakening home sales imply less broker commissions, further eroding residential investment. Prospective buyers are facing an affordability battle on two fronts as home prices have continued to climb even as an increase in listings has marginally improved the supply situation. Souring home builder sentiment and a slip in single-family permits presage a possible slowdown in single-family construction. Adverse single-family affordability has helped boost multifamily demand, but multifamily development should continue to downshift in response to robust incoming supply and high interest rates.


Investment: Nonresidential Structures

- We have left our structures investment outlook unchanged. We suspect structures investment will decline in 2024 as higher interest rates, stringent lending conditions and rising vacancy rates continue to weigh on commercial construction.

The tighter lending environment and rising commercial vacancies continue to curb nonresidential construction activity. Private nonresidential spending contracted for the third time this year in April, the latest evidence that activity is downshifting. Spending fell across most private segments in April, with growth in commercial outlays generally remaining on a downward trend alongside weakening demand for warehouses, hotels, retail and office space. That said, manufacturing projects remain a bright spot in the development landscape. The high-tech building boom, concentrated in the computer, electronic & electrical manufacturing sector, has helped firm up overall private nonresidential spending thanks in large part to supportive fiscal policy. Continued weakness in the Architectural Billings Index points to slower private nonresidential spend in the near term. We look for structures investment growth to rebound in 2025 as interest rate cuts eventually help bring about a turnaround in commercial development.



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and Wells Fargo Economics



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and Wells Fargo Economics

Labor Market



- May's increase in nonfarm payrolls, particularly in less cyclically-sensitive industries like healthcare and government, suggests hiring is retaining a bit more momentum. We now expect nonfarm payrolls to expand an average of 174K per month in the second half of the year compared to an average of 134K in our May forecast.
- Despite the ongoing strength in payrolls, other data point to continued softening in the labor market. We look for the unemployment rate to continue creeping higher, peaking a tick higher than our previous forecast at 4.2% early next year.

The labor market continues to gradually cool from its red-hot state a year or two ago. While nonfarm payrolls are still expanding at a brisk clip, as evidenced by the 272K gain in May, other data suggest conditions are slowly softening. Not only has the unemployment rate risen to 4.0% from 3.4% last April, but job openings have fallen to more than a three-year low, temporary employment has declined in 25 of the past 26 months, and growth in part-time employment continues to outpace full-time employment. Yet, while directionally demand for workers is weakening, the recent gain in payrolls suggests hiring is retaining a bit more momentum. We look for payroll growth to slow more modestly in the second half of this year as a result. However, the slightly firmer path of payrolls is unlikely to prevent the unemployment rate from edging up a bit further than we previously expected given the gulf between the household and establishment surveys' measures of employment, discussed in detail in this recent [report](#).

Inflation

- We have not made any material changes to our inflation outlook after the latest monthly data suggest a downward trend in inflation has indeed resumed after hitting a bump in Q1.
- With services inflation starting to cool more meaningfully, we continue to look for the monthly pace of inflation to downshift in the second half of the year, even as unfavorable base effects push up the year-over-year rate of core PCE to 2.8 in Q4.

After flaring up in the first quarter, inflation looks to be back on a downward path. We expect price growth to trend lower through the remainder of the year as supply pressures ease a bit further, the labor market cools, consumers grow more price-sensitive, and prior softening in the housing market feeds into official measures of shelter inflation. However, the pace of improvement is likely to remain slower-going than last year with the bulk of supply-related benefits having already filtered through to goods prices and services prices slow to adjust to fading price pressures. Although the monthly pace of inflation is expected to be lower in the second half of the year compared to H1, unfavorable base effects are likely to keep the year-over-year rate of core PCE inflation little changed. We look for the core PCE to be up 2.8% on a Q4/Q4 basis this year, on par with its current one-year change.



Fiscal Policy

- Our federal budget deficit forecasts for FY 2024 and FY 2025 are \$1.7 trillion and \$1.8 trillion, respectively.

U.S. fiscal policy developments have been quiet over the past month, with the annual budget, debt ceiling and foreign aid policy debates all dormant for the time being. In our view, Congress is likely to pass a continuing resolution (CR) that funds the federal government at the start of the next fiscal year on Oct. 1. It is uncertain how long a CR would last, but our best guess is that it would run through at least mid-December and possibly into Q1-2025 when the next Congress would be in place to grapple with the annual appropriations process and debt ceiling. In the meantime, government hiring growth remains solid, led by state and local governments. State and local government employment is roughly 1.5% above its pre-pandemic level, boosted by the strong economic recovery, robust federal aid and an improved pension funding outlook.

Monetary Policy & Interest Rates


- We expect the FOMC to leave the federal funds rate unchanged until the September meeting, at which point we expect a 25 bps rate cut followed by one more in December and another 100 bps of easing in 2025. This outlook is unchanged from our forecast in May.
- We expect the current pace of quantitative tightening (QT) to continue through Q1-2025.
- Our forecasts for the 10-year Treasury yield at year-end 2024 and 2025 are 4.00% and 3.75%, respectively.

The FOMC remains in wait-and-see mode as the committee continues to seek slower inflation data that instills "greater confidence" that annual price growth is firmly on the trajectory back to 2%. CPI data for May were an important step in that process, with core CPI posting the smallest monthly increase since August 2021. On balance, we remain confident that the FOMC will begin reducing the federal funds rate before the year is out. It will be a close call between one or two 25 bps rate cuts this year, and the [Committee seems evenly split between](#) the two outcomes. Our base case forecast since early April has looked for a 25 bps rate cut at each of the September and December FOMC meetings. Our forecast remains two cuts this year and another 100 bps of easing in 2025.

In the background, the Federal Reserve will continue balance sheet runoff. The central bank has already reduced its security holdings by \$1.7 trillion since it began QT in June 2022, and we think another ~\$400 billion or so of runoff is still to come. We look for QT to continue at its current pace through Q1-2025. Starting in Q2 of next year, we look for the central bank to hold its balance sheet flat for a couple of quarters. Starting later in 2025, we expect gradual balance sheet growth to resume to ensure that bank reserves remain ample and money markets continue to operate smoothly.

State & Local Pension Funding Ratio


Pension Plan Assets as a Share of Total Pension Liabilities



Source: Federal Reserve Board and Wells Fargo Economics

Federal Reserve Balance Sheet

Share of GDP



Source: Federal Reserve Board, U.S. Department of Commerce and Wells Fargo Economics

Net Exports

- Trade subtracted almost a full percentage point from overall GDP growth in Q1. We now anticipate the drag from trade in the second quarter will be 0.6 percentage points.
- After weighing on growth in the first half of 2024, we anticipate trade will be a non-factor at least in terms of GDP impact in the second half of the year.
- If our forecast is right and the economy regains momentum in 2025, we expect imports to grow faster than exports, resulting in a consistent drag from trade.

Net exports were a sizable drag on Q1 GDP growth. The latest data for April show weakness in exports driven by a decline in industrial supplies. Imports surged, fueled by capital goods and vehicles, and led the U.S. trade deficit to balloon to its widest point since late 2022. That sets the stage for trade to be a spoiler again in the second quarter. We now have net exports subtracting 0.6 percentage points off real GDP growth in Q2—larger than the 0.4 percentage point drag we had penciled in last month. As domestic demand slows in the second half of the year, we look for trade to be a neutral factor on overall GDP growth. As the economy regains momentum in 2025, we expect trade to be a steady, though not particularly strong, headwind for growth.

International Developments & the U.S. Dollar

- We have lowered our 2024 global GDP growth forecast slightly to 2.9%, from 3.0% a month ago. A softer outlook for the United States, Japan and Canada has been offset in part by a stronger outlook for the United Kingdom and Brazil.
- Given lingering inflation concerns, our outlook for global monetary policy continues to trend in a less dovish direction. We see more gradual easing from the European Central Bank and Mexico's central bank compared to a month ago, while we believe Brazil's central bank may have reached the end of its rate-cut cycle.
- Our outlook for the U.S. dollar is little changed. Fed policy interest rates that are expected to remain elevated for some time should support the greenback through late 2024. We forecast a trend of modest dollar depreciation through 2025 as the Fed eases monetary policy.
- For further reading on the global economy, please see our most recent [International Economic Outlook](#).



We maintain a relatively resilient outlook for the global economy in 2024, although the past month has seen some uncertainty re-introduced into the outlook. Our forecast is for global GDP to expand by 2.9% this year, down slightly from the 3.0% growth we forecast a month ago. To be sure, some of the downgrade stems from a softer outlook for the U.S. economy. However, with Japan's economy still on an uneven path and showing a renewed contraction in the first quarter, we now forecast scant Japanese GDP growth for 2024 as a whole. We also see softer growth in Canada after a disappointing first quarter. On the flip side, real income trends and sentiment continue to show overall improvement in the Eurozone and United Kingdom, contributing to an ongoing recovery for those regions.

The outcome of recent elections, notably for some emerging economies, has also introduced some uncertainty into the outlook. In India, Prime Minister Modi's party underperformed, falling short of an outright parliamentary majority. Meanwhile, in Mexico, President-elect Sheinbaum's Morena party (along with its allies) performed strongly, securing an effective congressional supermajority. Both outcomes have injected some policy uncertainty into the outlook and, while our 2024 GDP growth forecasts for India and Mexico are lower than a month ago, the risks still probably lie to the downside.

Another factor contributing to a mildly more unsettled outlook are lingering inflation concerns, which continue to see policy interest rates lean in the direction of remaining at elevated levels for a longer period of time. We see more gradual easing from some foreign central banks compared to a month ago. Even though the European Central Bank (ECB) cut rates in June, elevated wage growth and services inflation means we see the ECB lowering its policy rate at only a 25 bps-per-quarter pace, ending 2024 at 3.25%. In Mexico, political uncertainty and a weak Mexican peso means we forecast a more cautious Banxico than previously. In Brazil, sticky services inflation, some slippage in the government's fiscal discipline and recent currency weakness means we believe monetary easing has already come to an end. For the Reserve Bank of Australia and Reserve Bank of New Zealand, we

have not made any changes to our monetary policy forecast just yet, though we also believe the risks are tilted toward rate cuts starting later than currently anticipated for these central banks.

Our outlook for the U.S. dollar is little changed. With Fed rate cuts not expected until later this year, and after many other central banks will have begun monetary easing, we forecast a period of U.S. dollar strength to persist until around Q3 of this year. That said, the gradual pace of easing we expect from many foreign central banks should still also mean only moderate U.S. dollar strength and moderate foreign currency weakness this year. We still forecast a trend of gradual U.S. dollar depreciation over the longer term, starting late this year and continuing through most of 2025. We expect the greenback to come under some pressure as the Federal Reserve joins the trend of global monetary easing, and as growth in U.S. economic activity eventually slows.



Wells Fargo International Economic Forecast								
	GDP				CPI			
	2022	2023	2024	2025	2022	2023	2024	2025
Global (PPP Weights)	3.5%	3.2%	2.9%	2.7%	8.7%	4.5%	3.6%	3.4%
Advanced Economies ¹	2.6%	1.6%	1.7%	2.0%	7.3%	4.9%	2.9%	2.4%
United States	1.9%	2.5%	2.3%	1.9%	8.0%	4.1%	3.1%	2.6%
Eurozone	3.4%	0.6%	0.8%	1.6%	8.4%	5.4%	2.3%	2.1%
United Kingdom	4.3%	0.1%	0.8%	1.5%	9.1%	7.3%	2.6%	2.3%
Japan	1.0%	1.8%	0.1%	1.3%	2.5%	3.3%	2.2%	1.7%
Canada	3.8%	1.2%	0.8%	1.8%	6.8%	3.9%	2.4%	2.1%
Switzerland	2.7%	0.7%	1.4%	1.6%	2.8%	2.2%	1.4%	1.2%
Australia	3.8%	2.0%	1.2%	2.1%	6.6%	5.6%	3.4%	2.7%
New Zealand	2.4%	0.6%	0.8%	2.3%	7.2%	5.8%	3.3%	2.2%
Sweden	2.7%	0.1%	1.1%	1.7%	8.1%	8.6%	2.9%	1.9%
Norway	3.0%	1.1%	0.7%	1.5%	5.8%	5.5%	3.4%	2.5%
Developing Economies ¹	4.1%	4.3%	3.8%	3.3%	9.8%	4.1%	4.2%	4.2%
China	3.0%	5.2%	5.1%	4.3%	2.0%	0.2%	0.8%	1.6%
India	6.5%	7.7%	7.0%	6.6%	6.7%	5.7%	5.0%	4.5%
Mexico	3.9%	3.2%	1.7%	2.0%	7.9%	5.5%	4.6%	4.1%
Brazil	3.0%	2.9%	1.8%	2.0%	9.3%	4.8%	4.0%	3.6%

Forecast as of: June 14, 2024
¹Aggregated Using PPP Weights

Source: International Monetary Fund and Wells Fargo Economics

Bloomberg Finance L.P. and Wells Fargo Economics

Wells Fargo International Interest Rate Forecast							
(End of Quarter Rates)							
	Central Bank Key Policy Rate						
	2024				2025		
	Current	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3
United States	5.50%	5.50%	5.25%	5.00%	4.75%	4.50%	4.25%
Eurozone ¹	3.75%	3.75%	3.50%	3.25%	3.00%	2.75%	2.50%
United Kingdom	5.25%	5.25%	5.00%	4.50%	4.00%	3.75%	3.50%
Japan	0.10%	0.10%	0.10%	0.20%	0.20%	0.20%	0.20%
Canada	4.75%	4.75%	4.25%	4.00%	3.75%	3.50%	3.25%
Switzerland	1.50%	1.25%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%
Australia	4.35%	4.35%	4.35%	4.10%	3.85%	3.60%	3.35%
New Zealand	5.50%	5.50%	5.25%	4.75%	4.50%	4.00%	3.75%
Sweden	3.75%	3.75%	3.50%	3.00%	2.75%	2.50%	2.25%
Norway	4.50%	4.50%	4.25%	4.00%	3.75%	3.50%	3.25%
China ³	10.00%	10.00%	9.50%	9.50%	9.00%	9.00%	8.50%
India	6.50%	6.50%	6.50%	6.00%	5.75%	5.75%	5.75%
Mexico	11.00%	11.00%	11.00%	10.75%	10.25%	9.75%	9.25%
Brazil	10.50%	10.50%	10.50%	10.50%	10.50%	10.50%	10.50%
Chile	6.00%	5.50%	5.25%	4.75%	4.75%	4.75%	4.75%
Colombia	11.75%	11.25%	10.25%	9.25%	8.25%	7.75%	7.25%
	2-Year Note						
	2024				2025		
	Current	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3
United States	4.70%	4.75%	4.35%	4.05%	3.85%	3.70%	3.55%
Eurozone ²	2.91%	2.95%	2.85%	2.75%	2.65%	2.55%	2.45%
United Kingdom	4.25%	4.25%	4.15%	3.85%	3.60%	3.50%	3.45%
Japan	0.33%	0.30%	0.30%	0.35%	0.35%	0.35%	0.35%
Canada	3.87%	3.90%	3.70%	3.60%	3.50%	3.40%	3.30%
	10-Year Note						
	2024				2025		
	Current	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3
United States	4.27%	4.35%	4.15%	4.00%	3.90%	3.85%	3.80%
Eurozone ²	2.51%	2.55%	2.45%	2.40%	2.35%	2.30%	2.30%
United Kingdom	4.14%	4.15%	4.05%	3.85%	3.60%	3.55%	3.50%
Japan	0.98%	1.05%	1.10%	1.15%	1.10%	1.05%	1.00%
Canada	3.35%	3.40%	3.30%	3.25%	3.20%	3.15%	3.15%

Forecast as of: June 14, 2024
¹ ECB Deposit Rate ² German Government Bond Yield ³ Reserve Requirement Ratio Major Banks

Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P. and Wells Fargo Economics

This Month's Economic Calendar

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
June 10	11	12	13	14
	China CPI (YoY) May 0.3%	CPI (MoM) May 0.0% Core CPI (MoM) May 0.2% FOMC Statement (Upper Bound) June 5.50%	PPI Final Demand (MoM) May -0.2%	Import Price Index (MoM) Apr 0.9% Bank of Japan Target Rate (Upper Bound) Previous 0.10%
		Powell* FOMC Press Conference		Goolsbee and Cook* speak
17	18	19	20	21
	Retail Sales (MoM) Apr 0.0%	Juneteenth [U.S. Bond Markets Closed]	Housing Starts (SAAR) Apr 1,360K	Existing Home Sales (SAAR) Apr 4,140K
	Industrial Production (MoM) Apr 0.0%	United Kingdom CPI (MoM) Apr 0.3%	Japan National CPI (YoY) Apr 2.5%	
	Reserve Bank of Australia Cash Rate Target Previous 4.35%	Central Bank of Brazil Selic Rate Previous 10.50%	Bank of England Bank Rate Previous 5.25%	
Harker speaks	Kugler*, Barkin*, Musalem and Goolsbee speak		Barkin* speaks	
24	25	26	27	28
	Consumer Confidence May 102.0	New Home Sales (SAAR) Apr 634K	Durable Goods Orders (MoM) Apr 0.6%	Personal Income & Spending (MoM) Apr 0.3%; 0.2%
	Canada CPI (YoY) Apr 2.7%		Bank of Mexico Overnight Rate Previous 11.00%	
	Bowman* speaks			Barkin* speaks
July 1	2	3	4	5
ISM Manufacturing May 48.7	JOLTS Job Openings Apr 8,059K Eurozone CPI (MoM) Apr 0.2%	Trade Balance Apr -\$74.6B ISM Services May 53.8	Independence Day [U.S. Bond Markets Closed]	Employment May 272K
	Powell* speaks	FOMC Minutes	United Kingdom General Election	

Note: * = voting FOMC member in 2024, Purple = Market Moving Releases

Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P., Federal Reserve System, U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Department of Commerce, Institute for Supply Management, Conference Board and Wells Fargo Economics

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