

## U.S. Economic Outlook: October 2025

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### Awaiting the Data Deluge


- We have become modestly more constructive on the outlook for economic growth and now expect U.S. real GDP to expand 2.0% in 2025 and 2.3% in 2026 on an annual average basis, a bit stronger than our September update. Our forecast for growth in 2027 remains essentially unchanged at 2.3%.
- Our upgraded growth forecast follows stronger readings on consumer spending. Although some U.S. consumer segments are under stress against a backdrop of weaker real income growth, the latest spending data point to aggregate personal consumption expenditures growing at an annualized rate of 3.0% in Q3-2025, an accelerated pace from the first half of the year.
- Growth in business investment, in part due to robust AI and other high-tech investment, is another short-run support factor. However, the headwinds from elevated capital costs, trade policy changes and increased uncertainty will likely become more evident as the year rounds to a close.
- Emerging strains in the labor market have become more challenging to discern with the federal government shutdown putting the September employment report on hold. Alternative data, such as ADP's payroll report, suggest that employment growth is still soft, a trend we expect to continue in the near term.
- Inflation remains above the FOMC's 2% target. The core PCE deflator was up 2.9% year-over-year in August. Services prices continue to moderate, while higher goods prices are exerting an upward force on inflation. Given the impacts of recent trade policy changes have not been fully realized, core inflation of 2.9% year-over-year in Q3 and 3.0% in Q4 seems likely in our view. We then forecast a gradual easing through 2026 and 2027 as trade policy impacts dissipate.
- We maintain our view that the FOMC will "look through" a temporary uptick in inflation from tariffs and put more weight on the downside risks to the labor market. As such, we continue to see a 25 basis point cut at both the October and December FOMC meetings, with two additional 25 bps rate reductions in the first half of 2026. This would bring the terminal federal funds rate range to 3.00%-3.25% by the middle of next year.

## Awaiting the Data Deluge

The economic outlook is unusually cloudy at present. On Oct. 1, the federal government shut down as lawmakers failed to pass a bill to fund the government past September. As we go to print, the shutdown continues with a reopening date uncertain. The shutdown will cause a dip in the government component of GDP in Q4. Assuming the shutdown has ended by Q1, government purchases should then rebound in the first three months of 2026, recouping most (though not all) of the lost economic output.

There are other economic implications of the government shutdown beyond the technical GDP implications. One is that the government's statistical agencies responsible for collecting and distributing most economic data are closed. This means that forecasters, financial market participants and policymakers are not able to digest important economic indicators released by agencies such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Notably, the Employment Situation report for September has been delayed indefinitely, preventing a more current view of the labor market. What's more, if the shutdown stretches on, it could delay a host of other key data. To use inflation as an example, the Consumer Price Index report is currently scheduled for release on Oct. 15, while the Producer Price Index is slated for Oct 16. The federal government will eventually reopen, and a flood of new economic data will follow. But until then, we are forced to rely primarily on private sector data to inform the economic outlook.


All that being said, the data in hand point to economic activity remaining resilient in recent months. With the October update, we have upgraded our estimate of Q3-2025 real GDP growth to 3.5%, close to the strong pace registered in Q2. Despite significant economic policy change and high levels of uncertainty, which have persisted throughout much of the year, economic growth currently appears to be maintaining a positive trajectory. And while some of the recent strength in GDP growth can be attributed to the noise of businesses pulling forward imports in response to anticipated tariffs, the expected Q3 out-turn looks owed to continued growth in business investment and a pickup in consumer spending.



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and Wells Fargo Economics


One major theme over the past several years has been the surprising strength of the U.S. household sector. Consumer-related headwinds have seemingly grown only more intense against a backdrop of a higher interest rate environment and a weakening labor market. Yet, recent upward revisions to the personal income and spending data suggest that households are still spending at a solid clip. The latest spending data point to real personal consumption expenditures rising 3.0% in Q3-2025, about twice the pace as our previous estimate and a quarterly annualized pace on par with 2024's average annual rate. We still ultimately anticipate a slower pace of spending is ahead as weaker disposable income growth weighs on household spending. For the time being, however, the resilient consumer narrative remains intact.

Business fixed investment looks to be another short-run support factor. Investment growth is moderating as increased uncertainty and high financing costs weigh on capital spending. Despite these



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and Wells Fargo Economics

constraints, Q3 growth is trending positive, though a bifurcating trend in investment is increasingly apparent. On the one hand, strong growth in information processing equipment and software spending continues to prop up the top line, reflecting robust growth in AI and high-tech investment. On the other hand, declining structures investment remains a notable drag. Even with surging new data center construction, most other major segments of private nonresidential construction are pulling back. All told, business fixed investment is currently supportive of overall GDP growth; however, we expect the headwinds from elevated capital costs, trade policy changes and increased uncertainty to become more evident as the year rounds to a close.




Source: U.S. Department of Labor and Wells Fargo Economics

The better-than-expected performance in terms of overall economic growth, although encouraging, stands in stark contrast to evidence of a labor market that has lost momentum. As mentioned earlier, the federal government shutdown prevents us from having a clear read on labor market conditions during September. Alternative data sources, such as Federal Reserve Purchasing Manager Indexes and private sector sources like Indeed and ADP, point to conditions neither significantly degrading nor materially improving in recent weeks. Overall, we suspect that employment growth is still moderating. Initial jobless claims data also are on hold, but the most recent data we have suggest claims are not rising sharply, consistent with low layoff rates in the JOLTS data. As such, the "low hire, low fire" labor market seems likely to persist, and we look for monthly job gains to remain tepid around 50K per month through year-end when excluding the impact from the end of the deferred resignation program for federal workers. The continued pullback in labor demand is poised to push the unemployment rate up to a peak of 4.5% by year-end.

Meantime, inflation continues to slowly drift away from the FOMC's 2% target. The core PCE deflator was up 2.9% year-over-year in August, a rise mostly driven by climbing goods prices. We continue to expect price pressures to broaden somewhat in the coming months as stronger-than-expected consumer demand restores firms' pricing power and firms restock inventories at prevailing tariff rates. Although inflation's pickup will likely be limited by the softening labor market fundamentals, we expect core PCE inflation to run warm, averaging 2.9% in Q3 and 3.0% in Q4 on a year-over year basis. We then forecast a gradual slowing in inflation through 2026 and 2027 as the trade policy impacts dissipate.

Despite growing tension between Federal Reserve's dual mandate of full employment and stable prices, the FOMC restarted monetary easing at the September meeting by reducing the fed funds target range by 25 bps. The cut provided credence to our view that the FOMC will continue to "look through" a temporary uptick in inflation and put more weight on growing downside risks in the labor market. As such, we continue to see a 25 basis point cut at both the October and December FOMC meetings, with two additional 25 bps rate reductions in the first half of 2026. This would bring the terminal federal funds rate range to 3.00%-3.25%.



Source: Federal Reserve Board and Wells Fargo Economics

## U.S. Forecast Table

## Wells Fargo U.S. Economic Forecast

	Actual																Forecast			
	2024				2025				2026				2027				Actual		Forecast	
	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	2024	2025	2026	2027
Real Gross Domestic Product (a)	0.8	3.6	3.3	1.8	-0.6	3.8	3.5	0.9	1.6	2.7	2.7	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.0	2.5	2.8	2.0	2.3	2.3
Personal Consumption	1.7	3.9	4.0	3.9	0.6	2.5	3.0	1.1	1.9	2.6	2.4	2.2	2.1	2.4	2.1	2.4	2.9	2.5	2.1	2.3
Business Fixed Investment	1.5	2.5	3.5	-3.7	9.5	7.3	3.3	-2.0	2.5	5.1	3.8	3.4	3.1	3.0	3.0	3.7	2.9	3.8	2.7	3.4
Equipment	0.5	8.9	8.2	-4.3	21.4	8.5	6.3	-6.3	2.3	6.7	5.0	3.8	1.7	1.9	2.1	2.7	3.5	7.7	2.7	3.0
Intellectual Property Products	6.7	0.7	2.6	-0.6	6.5	15.0	5.0	2.8	4.6	5.0	3.3	3.0	4.1	3.7	3.4	4.4	3.5	5.4	4.7	3.7
Structures	-5.0	-3.9	-2.2	-8.1	-3.1	-7.5	-6.9	-4.3	-2.1	1.7	2.4	3.4	3.6	3.9	4.0	4.2	1.1	-5.4	-1.9	3.4
Residential Investment	8.2	-2.0	-4.8	4.3	-1.0	-5.1	-5.2	-3.5	-2.3	1.8	2.4	2.9	3.8	3.9	4.3	4.5	3.2	-2.0	-1.4	3.5
Government Purchases	2.3	3.3	5.4	3.3	-1.0	-0.1	1.5	-1.4	2.6	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.1	3.8	1.3	1.0	1.2
Net Exports	-964.1	-1032.2	-1064.9	-1069.0	-1380.7	-1058.0	-1034.9	-986.9	-994.2	-1003.4	-1003.8	-1011.3	-1024.2	-1042.3	-1064.2	-1080.6	-1032.6	-1115.1	-1003.2	-1052.8
Pct. Point Contribution to GDP	-0.4	-1.0	-0.4	-0.1	-4.7	4.8	0.4	0.8	-0.1	-0.2	0.0	-0.1	-0.2	-0.3	-0.4	-0.3	-0.5	-0.4	0.5	-0.2
Inventory Change	12.4	75.1	69.4	17.1	172.0	-18.3	8.6	10.1	-9.3	-5.4	8.6	14.0	21.0	21.8	28.0	36.5	43.5	43.1	1.9	26.8
Pct. Point Contribution to GDP	-0.8	1.2	-0.1	-0.9	2.6	-3.4	0.5	0.0	-0.3	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	-0.2	0.1
Nominal GDP (a)	4.0	6.3	5.1	4.3	2.9	6.0	6.6	4.0	4.6	5.5	5.2	4.6	4.5	4.5	4.2	4.7	5.3	4.8	5.1	4.6
Real Final Sales	1.7	2.4	3.5	2.8	-3.2	7.5	3.1	0.9	2.0	2.7	2.5	2.2	2.1	2.2	1.9	2.3	2.8	2.1	2.5	2.2
Retail Sales (b)	1.8	2.5	2.3	3.9	4.5	4.3	4.4	2.8	3.0	3.1	2.2	2.6	2.5	2.3	2.2	2.1	2.6	4.0	2.7	2.3
Inflation Indicators (b)																				
PCE Deflator	2.8	2.7	2.4	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.7	2.9	2.7	2.9	2.8	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.2	2.2	2.6	2.7	2.7	2.3
"Core" PCE Deflator	3.1	2.8	2.8	3.0	2.8	2.7	2.9	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.9	2.6	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.9	2.9	2.9	2.3
Consumer Price Index	3.2	3.2	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.5	2.9	2.9	2.7	3.0	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.4	3.0	2.8	2.8	2.5
"Core" Consumer Price Index	3.8	3.4	3.3	3.3	3.1	2.8	3.1	3.0	3.0	3.2	3.0	2.8	2.6	2.5	2.4	2.4	3.4	3.0	3.0	2.5
Producer Price Index (Final Demand)	1.5	2.6	2.2	3.1	3.5	2.5	2.8	2.5	1.9	2.5	2.1	2.1	2.1	2.0	1.9	1.9	2.4	2.8	2.2	2.0
Employment Cost Index	4.2	4.1	3.9	3.8	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.5	3.4	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.6	3.6	3.7	4.0	3.6	3.5	3.6
Real Disposable Income (a)	4.2	2.4	1.2	2.0	2.3	3.1	-0.1	0.0	4.8	1.5	2.1	2.2	2.3	2.0	2.2	2.2	2.9	1.8	2.1	2.1
Nominal Personal Income (a)	7.6	5.4	3.6	4.9	6.4	5.5	3.1	3.5	4.5	4.2	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.3	4.5	4.4	5.6	4.9	4.2	4.5
Industrial Production (a)	-1.8	2.4	-0.6	-1.2	4.1	1.6	0.2	-2.4	0.1	2.2	1.9	1.4	1.5	1.0	1.1	0.5	-0.3	1.0	0.4	1.4
Capacity Utilization	77.7	78.0	77.6	77.1	77.6	77.6	77.2	76.5	76.6	77.1	77.6	78.0	78.4	78.7	79.0	79.3	77.6	77.2	77.3	78.8
Federal Budget Balance (c)	-555	-209	-544	-711	-596	-30	-413	-553	-729	-246	-472	-581	-766	-257	-495	-620	-1817	-1750	-2000	-2100
Trade Weighted Dollar Index (d)	115.8	117.3	113.3	119.9	117.7	111.4	111.1	108.4	107.7	107.4	107.9	109.6	111.4	112.0	111.4	110.2	116.4	112.2	108.2	111.3
Nonfarm Payroll Change (e)	196	133	133	209	111	55	49	11	63	80	100	108	102	95	88	82	168	56	88	92
Unemployment Rate	3.8	4.0	4.2	4.1	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.5	4.4	4.4	4.3	4.2	4.1	4.1	4.1	4.0	4.0	4.3	4.3	4.1
Housing Starts (f)	1.42	1.34	1.34	1.39	1.40	1.35	1.31	1.20	1.36	1.36	1.36	1.37	1.41	1.41	1.41	1.41	1.37	1.32	1.36	1.41
Light Vehicle Sales (g)	15.5	15.7	15.7	16.5	16.4	16.1	16.3	15.3	14.9	15.1	15.2	15.5	16.4	16.6	16.7	16.9	15.9	16.0	15.2	16.7
Crude Oil - Brent - Front Contract (h)	81.2	84.4	78.0	73.6	74.3	65.9	67.5	62.8	61.2	63.5	65.5	65.5	65.5	66.2	65.5	65.5	79.3	67.6	63.9	65.7
Quarter-End Interest Rates (i)																				
Federal Funds Target Rate (j)	5.50	5.50	5.00	4.50	4.50	4.50	4.25	3.75	3.50	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	5.27	4.25	3.31	3.25
Secured Overnight Financing Rate	5.34	5.33	4.96	4.49	4.41	4.45	4.24	3.65	3.40	3.15	3.15	3.15	3.15	3.15	3.15	3.15	5.15	4.19	3.21	3.15
Prime Rate	8.50	8.50	8.00	7.50	7.50	7.50	7.25	6.75	6.50	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.25	8.27	7.25	6.31	6.25
Conventional Mortgage Rate	6.82	6.92	6.18	6.72	6.65	6.82	6.35	6.30	6.20	6.20	6.25	6.25	6.25	6.30	6.30	6.35	6.72	6.53	6.23	6.30
3 Month Bill	5.46	5.48	4.73	4.37	4.32	4.41	4.02	3.60	3.35	3.15	3.15	3.15	3.15	3.15	3.15	3.15	5.18	4.09	3.20	3.15
6 Month Bill	5.38	5.33	4.38	4.24	4.23	4.29	3.83	3.50	3.30	3.20	3.20	3.20	3.20	3.20	3.20	3.25	5.00	3.96	3.23	3.21
1 Year Bill	5.03	5.09	3.98	4.16	4.03	3.96	3.68	3.45	3.35	3.30	3.30	3.30	3.30	3.30	3.35	3.40	4.69	3.78	3.31	3.34
2 Year Note	4.59	4.71	3.66	4.25	3.89	3.72	3.60	3.45	3.40	3.35	3.35	3.35	3.35	3.40	3.45	3.50	4.37	3.67	3.36	3.43
5 Year Note	4.21	4.33	3.58	4.38	3.96	3.79	3.74	3.55	3.50	3.50	3.55	3.60	3.60	3.65	3.70	3.70	4.13	3.76	3.54	3.66
10 Year Note	4.20	4.36	3.81	4.58	4.23	4.24	4.16	4.00	3.95	4.00	4.10	4.15	4.15	4.20	4.20	4.25	4.21	4.16	4.05	4.20
30 Year Bond	4.34	4.51	4.14	4.78	4.59	4.78	4.73	4.70	4.70	4.80	4.90	4.95	5.00	5.05	5.05	5.10	4.41	4.70	4.84	5.05

Forecast as of: October 8, 2025

Notes: (a) Compound Annual Growth Rate Quarter-over-Quarter

(b) Year-over-Year Percentage Change

(c) Quarterly Sum - Billions USD; Annual Data Represents FisBZI Year

(d) Federal Reserve Advanced Foreign Economies Index, 2006=100 - Quarter End

(e) Average Monthly Change

(f) Quarterly Data - Average Monthly SAAR; Annual Data - Actual Total Houses Started

(g) Quarterly Data - Average Monthly SAAR; Annual Data - Actual Total Vehicles Sold

(h) Quarterly Average of Daily Close

(i) Quarterly Data - Period End; Annual Data - Annual Averages

(j) Upper Bound of the Federal Funds Target Range

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Department of Labor, IHS Markit, Federal Reserve Board and Wells Fargo Economics

## Forecast Delta Table

Changes to the Wells Fargo U.S. Economic Forecast																	
	Actual				Forecast												
	2024				2025				2026				2027				Actual
	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	1Q	2Q	3Q	4Q	2024
Real Gross Domestic Product (a)	-0.79	0.60	0.27	-0.60	-0.15	0.55	1.51	0.20	0.21	-0.16	-0.07	-0.03	0.04	0.05	0.12	0.06	0.00
Personal Consumption	-0.19	1.07	0.26	-0.14	0.15	0.90	1.50	0.56	-0.09	-0.16	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.08	0.21	0.10	0.19
Business Fixed Investment	-3.01	-1.40	-0.54	-0.74	-0.80	1.60	0.03	0.54	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.67
Equipment	0.13	-0.94	-2.64	4.44	-2.38	1.13	1.28	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.03	0.03	0.05	0.15
Intellectual Property Products	-0.79	-0.06	-0.49	-0.02	0.53	2.23	-1.05	1.25	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.41
Structures	-11.24	-4.02	2.75	-10.98	-0.69	1.44	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-2.37
Residential Investment	-5.48	0.76	-0.52	-1.23	0.38	-0.36	-0.70	-0.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.06
Government Purchases	0.53	0.29	0.31	0.25	-0.42	0.10	0.00	-1.95	1.12	-0.19	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.39
Net Exports	12.85	3.41	4.33	-16.34	-21.72	-29.08	20.06	19.89	20.09	20.39	20.69	21.02	21.29	21.50	21.71	21.93	1.06
Pct. Point Contribution to GDP	0.19	-0.14	0.02	-0.32	-0.07	-0.12	0.83	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	-0.03
Inventory Change	-5.33	3.40	11.54	8.16	11.47	14.59	-5.95	-2.46	2.27	1.32	-2.08	-3.40	-5.11	-5.30	-6.81	-8.89	4.44
Pct. Point Contribution to GDP	-0.34	0.12	0.11	-0.07	-0.01	-0.15	-0.35	0.06	0.08	-0.02	-0.06	-0.02	-0.03	0.00	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04
Nominal GDP	-0.66	0.66	0.07	-0.52	-0.30	0.70	1.50	0.27	0.23	-0.07	-0.01	0.01	0.10	0.13	0.18	0.09	0.06
Real Final Sales	-0.47	0.46	0.14	-0.53	-0.14	0.72	1.86	0.14	0.13	-0.14	-0.01	-0.01	0.06	0.06	0.15	0.09	0.04
Retail Sales (b)	0.00	0.00	-0.02	0.00	0.00	0.02	1.14	1.89	1.66	1.59	0.42	-0.51	-0.30	-0.26	-0.16	-0.03	-0.01
Inflation Indicators (b)																	
PCE Deflator	0.11	0.10	0.14	0.13	0.03	0.05	-0.01	-0.03	0.03	0.02	0.06	0.05	0.07	0.06	0.06	0.05	0.12
"Core" PCE Deflator	0.12	0.12	0.15	0.15	0.02	0.03	-0.07	-0.07	0.02	0.02	0.10	0.09	0.07	0.05	0.04	0.03	0.13
Consumer Price Index	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.09	0.06	0.06	-0.01	-0.03	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.00
"Core" Consumer Price Index	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.04	0.06	0.07	0.09	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00
Producer Price Index (Final Demand)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.43	-0.50	-0.49	-0.44	0.02	0.12	0.18	0.19	0.16	0.13	0.00
Employment Cost Index	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Real Disposable Income (a)	-1.39	1.36	1.02	-0.49	-0.21	0.18	0.26	0.18	-0.37	-0.07	-0.04	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.02	0.00	0.21
Nominal Personal Income (a)	-1.72	1.54	1.27	-0.48	-0.28	0.31	0.50	0.86	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.19
Industrial Production (a)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.13	0.07	1.79	1.17	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Capacity Utilization	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Federal Budget Balance (c)	0.00	0.00	15.60	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.14	-1.38	-0.66	3.18	-1.40	-2.04	0.09	3.35	-1.46	15.60
Trade Weighted Dollar Index (d)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.58	-0.80	-1.04	-2.58	-3.80	-4.12	-3.38	-2.73	-2.38	-2.51	0.00
Nonfarm Payroll Change (e)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-3.33	0.00	0.00	-6.67	-5.00	-5.00	-1.67	0.00	0.00	0.00
Unemployment Rate	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.07	0.10	0.10	0.00
Housing Starts (f)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Light Vehicle Sales (g)	0.07	0.10	0.12	-0.07	0.01	0.04	0.48	0.57	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.06
Crude Oil - Brent - Front Contract (h)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.58	-3.00	-4.67	-4.33	-3.00	-2.00	-1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Quarter-End Interest Rates (i)																	
Federal Funds Target Rate	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Secured Overnight Financing Rate	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Prime Rate	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Conventional Mortgage Rate	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
3 Month Bill	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.12	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
6 Month Bill	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1 Year Bill	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.08	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.00
2 Year Note	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.00
5 Year Note	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.14	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.00
10 Year Note	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.11	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
30 Year Bond	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Forecast as of: October 8, 2025

Notes: (a) Compound Annual Growth Rate Quarter-over-Quarter

(b) Year-over-Year Percentage Change

(c) Quarterly Sum - Billions USD; Annual Data Represents FisBZI Year

(d) Federal Reserve Advanced Foreign Economies Index, 2006=100 - Quarter End

(e) Average Monthly Change

(f) Quarterly Data - Average Monthly SAAR; Annual Data - Actual Total Houses Started

(g) Quarterly Data - Average Monthly SAAR; Annual Data - Actual Total Vehicles Sold

(h) Quarterly Average of Daily Close

(i) Quarterly Data - Period End; Annual Data - Annual Averages

(j) Upper Bound of the Federal Funds Target Range

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Department of Labor, IHS Markit, Federal Reserve Board and Wells Fargo Economics

## Personal Consumption Expenditures

- We've boosted our near-term estimate for consumer spending primarily on upward revisions to prior data that reveal stronger momentum. Our expectation for slower spending in the months ahead has not materially changed.

Consumer spending is shaping up to be stronger in the third quarter than we had originally anticipated. We now forecast real personal consumption expenditures (PCE) advanced at a 3% annualized rate in the third quarter, twice the pace we previously had forecast. The upward revision stems from revised GDP data that lifted the near-term trend and suggest consumer momentum remains intact.


Even as consumers have grown more concerned about their job prospects and tariff-induced price hikes, they've continued to spend. We still ultimately expect the pace of spending to slow in the remaining months of the year. Persistent uncertainty, slower disposable income growth, less credit reliance and some payback after a pull forward in discretionary goods purchases remains a tough hurdle for spending to top.

## Investment: Equipment, Intellectual Property Products and Inventories

- We have not made any material changes to our outlook for business fixed investment spending.

Business investment spending looks to have grown again in the third quarter, but at a slower clip than in Q2. The story under the hood continues to be a bifurcated one where investment dollars continue to flow into the hardware and software that is aiding the high-tech transition. Information processing equipment and software spending have been the notable bright spots in what has otherwise been a flagging sector amid persistent uncertainty around trade policy. The latest monthly data are consistent with our underlying expectations for equipment investment. Nondefense capital goods shipments (which feed into the BEA's measure of equipment in the GDP accounts) slipped 0.8% in August after jumping more than 3% in July. Inventories remain a wild card, having the capacity to lead to whipsaw effects across the headline.

Real Personal Consumption Expenditures



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and Wells Fargo Economics

Nondefense Capital Goods Shipments



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and Wells Fargo Economics

## Investment: Residential

- We have not materially altered our residential investment forecast. Although slightly lower mortgage rates improve the outlook for home sales somewhat, elevated single-family and apartment inventory are likely to prompt a downtrend in residential construction.

Data on residential permits, construction spending and home sales point to an ongoing deterioration in private residential investment. August's construction spending print was delayed by the government shutdown. However, private residential construction spending notched a scant 0.07% increase in July, an essentially sideways move. This marginal improvement followed a six-month string of declines, but it was likely inflated by higher materials prices and may be revised down in the future. Through the noise, the overall pace of permits has receded by 5.6% year-to-date through August as builders try to right-size inventory imbalances in the single-family and multifamily markets.


The recent step-down in mortgage rates may support a modest improvement in home sales in the coming months. That said, a glut of single-family inventory will likely discourage a corresponding increase in new home construction. The apartment market is facing similar pressures. Although poor affordability conditions will likely encourage strong apartment demand over the coming years, elevated vacancy rates, especially across the Sun Belt, limit the scope for a near-term construction rebound.

## Investment: Nonresidential Structures


- We expect structures investment to drag on GDP growth over the next few quarters. Although the Fed is poised to enact several more rate cuts, a pullback in commercial starts and weakness in architectural billings preclude an immediate pickup in nonresidential construction.

High interest rates have dealt a serious blow to nonresidential construction. Real structures spending has contracted for six consecutive quarters as of Q2. Private nonresidential construction spending continued to decline in July, hitting its lowest mark since March 2023. It is reasonable to assume that this downtrend will remain intact over the next few quarters. CoStar commercial starts have receded by a combined 70.8% from their 2022 peak as of Q2, implying that CRE construction will continue to moderate for some time. The architectural billings index reinforces this view, revealing a broad decline in new project inquiries and soft demand for design services at nonresidential architecture firms.

If realized, our expectations for 100 bps of Federal Reserve interest rate cuts by next summer would give a much-needed boost to the nonresidential construction sector next year. However, as is the case with monetary tightening, the effects of monetary easing can be lagged. We are not expecting an improvement in structures investment until mid-2026.



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and Wells Fargo Economics



Source: CoStar Inc. and Wells Fargo Economics

## Labor Market

- We have made no material changes to our labor market outlook this month. We continue to look for the unemployment rate to peak at 4.5% by the end of the year.



The jobs market remains fragile, and alternative data point to no meaningful change in September. The employment components of various Fed PMIs, ADP's measure of private sector employment, job postings on Indeed and the Conference Board's labor differential all weakened last month. While layoffs are still low, subdued quits and tepid hiring suggest workers are staying put. The lack of natural attrition creates upside risk for layoffs, in our view, as firms cannot rely as much on natural attrition to manage headcount.

As a result, we look for monthly job gains to remain tepid around 50K per month when excluding the impact from the end of the deferred resignation program for federal workers. The continued pullback in labor demand is poised to push the unemployment rate up to a peak of 4.5% by year-end. As looser monetary policy and fiscal support gain traction in early 2026, job growth should gradually recover through next year, bringing the unemployment rate down to 4.2% by Q4. With policy disruptions fading further into the rear-view mirror in 2027, we anticipate job creation to average 90K per month that year, stabilizing the unemployment rate at 4.1%.

## Inflation

- We look for the core PCE deflator to peak at 3.0% year-over-year in Q4-2025 and continue to run at that pace through the first half of 2026.
- We expect price pressures to remain more persistent in 2026 and now look for core PCE inflation to end the year at 2.6% year-over-year.

Inflation remains stubborn. Hiked tariffs have reignited goods inflation just as the disinflationary trend in services inflation has slowed. We continue to expect price pressures to broaden in the coming months as pre-"Liberation Day" stockpiles dwindle and stronger-than-expected consumer demand, particularly for discretionary items, helps restore firms' pricing power. That said, the extent of inflation's pickup will likely be tempered by the softening labor market. Weak job growth and tepid labor turnover have kept wage pressures in check, offering some cost relief for service providers and limiting the spillover of rising physical input costs to services inflation. We expect core PCE inflation to peak at 3.0% year-over-year in Q4, not too far from its current run-rate. While a sharp rise is unlikely from here, we anticipate resilient consumer demand will keep core inflation running at around a 3% annualized rate through the first half of 2026. As economic growth settles down closer to its long-run trend headed into 2027, we expect inflation to gradually recede and look for the core PCE deflator to subside to 2.3% year-over-year by the end of 2027.





## Fiscal Policy

- As of Oct 7, the federal government has been shut down for one week and counting. Non-essential government activities have ceased, and roughly 750,000 federal workers have been furloughed.
- Our forecasts for the federal budget deficit in FY 2026 and FY 2027 remain unchanged at \$2.00 trillion and \$2.10 trillion, respectively.

Fiscal year 2026 began on Wednesday, Oct. 1 with a government shutdown. A government shutdown involves the 26% of the federal budget that is "discretionary" spending and determined through the annual appropriations process. "Mandatory" spending, which is determined by a variety of eligibility requirements, formulas and other processes, generally continues uninterrupted during a government shutdown. All federal workers, including those deemed essential who are still working, are not paid during the shutdown. This includes active duty members of the military. These individuals will receive back pay after the shutdown is over.


The shutdown will cause a dip in the government component of GDP in Q4, weighing on economic growth in the current quarter. That said, most of this loss will be made up by a rebound in Q1, assuming the shutdown has ended by then ([chart](#)). In the meantime, we are left waiting for a resolution in Washington, D.C., and most major economic indicator releases have been delayed indefinitely. For financial markets, it is important to note that the current government shutdown episode is unrelated to the debt ceiling. The U.S. debt limit was increased by \$5 trillion in the Republican-passed One Big Beautiful Bill in July. As a result, the government will not run out of borrowing capacity during the shutdown, and Treasury security issuance will not be affected. For further reading on this topic, see our recent [special report](#).

## Monetary Policy & Interest Rates

- We continue to expect the FOMC to lower the federal funds rate by 25 bps at its next two meetings in October and December, followed by two additional cuts in March and June 2026.


Mounting signs of labor market fragility have complicated the Federal Reserve's pursuit of its maximum employment mandate. Meantime, inflation is likely to stay above the Committee's 2% price stability target for the foreseeable future. In our view, the FOMC will continue to prioritize the flagging labor market, even as progress on inflation stalls. We expect 25 bps rate cuts at each of the next two meetings, followed by two more rate cuts in the first half of 2026, bringing the fed funds rate closer to a neutral range of 3.00%-3.25%. While easier monetary policy should help pull down front-end yields, firmer growth and expanding fiscal deficits are likely to keep long-end rates from meaningfully declining. We continue to look for the 10-year Treasury yield to end 2025 near 4.00%, rising to 4.15% by the end of 2026. With the 10-year yield remaining elevated, we expect the conventional 30-year fixed mortgage rate to end 2026 around 6.25%, modestly below today's level of roughly 6.35%.

Real Federal Government Output



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce and Wells Fargo

Mortgage Rate vs. 10-Year Treasury Yield



Source: Freddie Mac, U.S. Treasury Department and Wells Fargo Economics

## Net Exports

- We now look for net exports to provide a modest boost rather than drag on third quarter GDP growth.

The advance goods trade data suggest a full reversal in import growth in August, suggesting the pop in industrial supplies was short-lived and potentially another last-ditch effort of businesses to get goods ashore ahead of higher reciprocal tariff rates taking effect in August. Goods exports were also weak during the month amid a pullback in consumer goods and autos specifically. The Trump administration has announced further tariffs in recent weeks on softwood lumber, furniture and potentially trucks and pharmaceuticals. For those trying to keep tabs on the tariff situation—see our latest [tariff tracker](#). The trade environment is anything but settled and import swings may be a new state of normal for the time being. We continue to expect the trade deficit to eventually level out near current levels over the forecast horizon.

## International Developments & the U.S. Dollar



- Prospects for the global economy continue to improve, and we now believe global GDP can rise 3% this year. The U.S. economy is driving the upward revision, while international economic performance is more mixed. These mixed growth prospects are also creating interesting divergences between central banks around the world.
- Our views on the U.S. dollar have not changed materially, and we continue to believe a dovish Federal Reserve and softening U.S. economic trends can place further downward pressure on the greenback through mid-2026. Longer term, we believe the dollar can recover as Fed easing ends and the U.S. economy rebounds.

We have again revised our outlook for the global economy in a more positive direction. To that point, we revised our global GDP forecast higher and now expect the global economy to grow 3.0% this year. In fairness, a more constructive outlook for the U.S. economy is the driving force of a more robust global economic outlook. As mentioned earlier, we still expect a softening in the U.S. economy over the second half of this year, but the slowdown is unlikely to be as acute as initially expected. International economies present a more mixed picture, while some have shown greater resilience than initially expected, others remain more vulnerable to tariffs and restrictive monetary policy. As far as the economies that are more resilient, of significant importance is China. The Chinese economy has weathered the tariff storm quite well, and now that tariff rates are reduced, and the trade truce extended, China remains within striking distance of the government's ~5% growth target. India has also demonstrated a fair amount of resilience. Although tariffs have been imposed on India, the U.S.-India trade relationship is not a driver of India's economy, and activity has held up. On the other hand, tariffs have taken a bit of a bigger chunk out of Canada. Canada's economy struggled in Q2 and leading indicators show underwhelming growth could continue through Q3 and the rest of this year.

Diverging growth prospects is leading to diverging paths for monetary policy among the world's largest central banks. The People's Bank of China (PBoC) has not adjusted monetary policy settings all that much as local economic trends have held up. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has already, or at a minimum is close to, ending its easing cycle. Bank of Canada (BoC) policymakers may also be approaching the end of their easing cycle; however, with local employment trends worsening and inflation closing in on the BoC's target, another 25 bps interest rate is likely to be delivered in the coming months. A similar dynamic exists in the Eurozone, where sluggish growth and moderate inflation pressures could also yield another European Central Bank (ECB) interest rate cut before the end of this year. Political risk across the Eurozone, but particularly in France, could disrupt the easing cycle as the euro is under a modest degree of pressure. But should political risk ease from here, policymakers may feel comfortable delivering one more rate cut. And in Japan, local economic trends are stable and improving while inflation pressures are gathering pace. In our view, these economic trends warrant another Bank of Japan (BoJ) rate hike in the coming months, but the election of a new administration complicates that outlook. The new head of the LDP, and likely new prime minister, has expressed a need for broad-based economic stimulus, including accommodative BoJ monetary policy. Select policymakers have already communicated that an October rate hike may be unlikely, but for now, we maintain our view for a 25 bps BoJ rate hike in December.

Despite upward revisions to our U.S. economic outlook, we have not made material adjustments to our outlook for the U.S. dollar. In our view, Fed rate cuts—particularly those that outpace major foreign central bank easing—should continue to place depreciation pressure on the greenback through the

end of this year and into the middle of 2026. A scenario where the U.S. economy's outperformance fades in H2-2025 should also act as a headwind for the dollar and be supportive of foreign currencies in the coming quarters. Foreign currencies associated with dovish central banks, the Canadian dollar in particular, could lag the overall trend of dollar weakness, while the Japanese yen could prove to be a notable outperformer if the BoJ indeed delivers a rate hike by the end of this year. Longer term, we believe the dollar can recover ground as the Fed's easing cycle ends and the U.S. economy picks up pace from fiscal and monetary stimulus. By H2-2026, we believe the U.S. economic out-performance will return, which, combined with the attractive carry associated with the dollar relative to peer G10 currencies, should push the greenback higher against most foreign currencies. As the dollar recovers starting in H2-2026, we also believe headlines around de-dollarization will begin to fade and the dollar's status as the world's reserve currency will no longer be in question. On the margin, as concerns around the dollar's safe-haven status diminish, the greenback should experience a boost from market participants re-engaging with dollar-denominated assets.



## Wells Fargo International Economic Forecast

	GDP				CPI			
	<u>2024</u>	<u>2025</u>	<u>2026</u>	<u>2027</u>	<u>2024</u>	<u>2025</u>	<u>2026</u>	<u>2027</u>
Global (PPP Weights)	3.3%	3.0%	2.7%	2.9%	5.6%	3.7%	3.7%	3.6%
Advanced Economies <sup>1</sup>	1.8%	1.8%	1.9%	2.1%	2.6%	2.7%	2.4%	2.4%
United States	2.8%	2.0%	2.3%	2.3%	3.0%	2.8%	2.8%	2.5%
Eurozone	0.9%	1.1%	1.2%	1.8%	2.4%	2.1%	1.8%	2.2%
United Kingdom	1.1%	1.5%	1.2%	1.6%	2.5%	3.4%	2.4%	2.1%
Japan	0.2%	1.4%	1.0%	0.8%	2.7%	3.0%	1.9%	2.0%
Canada	1.6%	1.1%	1.3%	2.0%	2.4%	2.1%	2.0%	2.0%
Switzerland	1.3%	1.1%	1.3%	1.6%	1.1%	0.2%	0.6%	1.0%
Australia	1.0%	1.7%	2.2%	2.4%	3.2%	2.6%	2.7%	2.5%
New Zealand	-0.5%	0.2%	2.0%	2.5%	2.9%	2.5%	2.1%	2.1%
Sweden	1.0%	1.1%	2.0%	2.2%	2.0%	2.4%	1.9%	2.1%
Norway	0.6%	1.9%	1.4%	1.8%	3.1%	2.8%	2.2%	2.3%
Developing Economies <sup>1</sup>	4.3%	3.8%	3.3%	3.4%	7.7%	4.4%	4.5%	4.4%
China	5.0%	4.8%	4.5%	4.4%	0.2%	0.0%	0.8%	1.0%
India	6.7%	7.1%	6.1%	6.6%	4.7%	3.3%	4.0%	3.7%
Mexico	1.4%	0.8%	1.4%	1.6%	4.7%	3.8%	3.8%	3.5%
Brazil	3.4%	2.4%	1.4%	2.0%	4.4%	5.3%	4.3%	4.0%
Russia	4.3%	1.5%	1.5%	1.5%	8.4%	9.0%	5.5%	4.5%

Forecast as of: October 8, 2025

<sup>1</sup>Aggregated Using PPP Weights

Source: International Monetary Fund and Wells Fargo Economics

## Wells Fargo International Interest Rate Forecast

(End of Quarter Rates)

	Central Bank Key Policy Rate						
	2025		2026				2027
	Current	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1
United States	4.25%	3.75%	3.50%	3.25%	3.25%	3.25%	3.25%
Eurozone <sup>1</sup>	2.00%	1.75%	1.75%	1.75%	1.75%	1.75%	1.75%
United Kingdom	4.00%	4.00%	3.75%	3.50%	3.25%	3.25%	3.25%
Japan	0.50%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%	0.75%
Canada	2.50%	2.25%	2.25%	2.25%	2.25%	2.25%	2.25%
Switzerland	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Australia	3.60%	3.35%	3.10%	3.10%	3.10%	3.10%	3.10%
New Zealand	2.50%	2.25%	2.25%	2.25%	2.25%	2.25%	2.25%
Sweden	1.75%	1.75%	1.75%	1.75%	1.75%	1.75%	1.75%
Norway	4.00%	4.00%	4.00%	3.75%	3.50%	3.50%	3.50%
China <sup>3</sup>	9.00%	8.50%	8.50%	8.00%	8.00%	7.50%	7.50%
India	5.50%	5.25%	5.25%	5.25%	5.25%	5.25%	5.25%
Mexico	7.50%	7.25%	7.25%	7.25%	7.25%	7.25%	7.25%
Brazil	15.00%	15.00%	14.50%	14.00%	13.50%	13.00%	12.50%
Chile	4.75%	4.50%	4.50%	4.50%	4.50%	4.50%	4.50%
Colombia	9.25%	9.25%	9.00%	8.50%	8.00%	8.00%	8.00%
Russia	17.00%	15.00%	13.00%	11.00%	10.00%	9.00%	8.50%
2-Year Note							
	2025		2026				2027
	Current	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1
United States	3.57%	3.45%	3.40%	3.35%	3.35%	3.35%	3.35%
Eurozone <sup>2</sup>	2.00%	1.90%	1.90%	1.95%	1.95%	2.00%	2.00%
United Kingdom	3.98%	3.95%	3.80%	3.65%	3.50%	3.50%	3.50%
Japan	0.93%	0.90%	0.90%	0.95%	0.95%	1.00%	1.00%
Canada	2.45%	2.35%	2.30%	2.30%	2.35%	2.35%	2.40%
10-Year Note							
	2025		2026				2027
	Current	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1
United States	4.13%	4.00%	3.95%	4.00%	4.10%	4.15%	4.15%
Eurozone <sup>2</sup>	2.71%	2.65%	2.65%	2.70%	2.75%	2.80%	2.85%
United Kingdom	4.72%	4.65%	4.55%	4.45%	4.40%	4.40%	4.45%
Japan	1.69%	1.65%	1.70%	1.70%	1.75%	1.75%	1.70%
Canada	3.18%	3.10%	3.05%	3.10%	3.15%	3.20%	3.25%

Forecast as of: October 8, 2025

<sup>1</sup> ECB Deposit Rate <sup>2</sup> German Government Bond Yield <sup>3</sup> Reserve Requirement Ratio Major Banks

Source: Bloomberg Finance L.P. and Wells Fargo Economics

## This Month's Economic Calendar

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday
<b>October 6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>
	<b>Trade Balance</b> Jul -\$77.9B <b>Reserve Bank of New Zealand</b> Prior 3.00%			<b>Consumer Sentiment</b> Sep 55.1
<i>Schmid* Speaks</i>	<i>Bostic, Bowman*, Miran*, Kashkari Speak</i>	<i>Musalem*, Barr*, Kashkari Speak</i>	<i>Powell*, Barr*, Bowman*, Kashkari, Daly Speak</i>	<i>Goolsbee*, Musalem* Speak</i>
<b>13</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>17</b>
	<b>NFIB Small Business Optimism</b> Aug 100.8 <b>China CPI (YoY)</b> Aug -0.4%	<b>CPI (MoM)</b> Aug 0.4%	<b>Retail Sales (MoM)</b> Aug 0.6% <b>PPI Final Demand (MoM)</b> Aug -0.1%	<b>Housing Starts</b> Aug 1307K <b>Import Price Index (MoM)</b> Aug 0.3% <b>Industrial Production (MoM)</b> Aug 0.1%
<i>Paulson Speaks</i>	<i>Collins* Speaks</i>	<i>Fed Releases Beige Book</i>		
<b>20</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>24</b>
<b>LEI (MoM)</b> Aug -0.5%		<b>UK CPI (MoM)</b> Aug 0.3%	<b>Existing Home Sales (SAAR)</b> Aug 4.00M <b>Japan CPI (YoY)</b> Aug 2.7%	<b>New Home Sales (SAAR)</b> Aug 800K
<b>27</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>Durable Goods Orders (MoM)</b> Aug 2.9%	<b>Consumer Confidence</b> Sep 94.2	<b>FOMC Rate Decision</b> Prior 4.25% <b>Bank of Canada Rate Decision</b> Prior 2.50%	<b>GDP (Annualized QoQ)</b> Q2 3.8% <b>European Central Bank Decision</b> Prior 2.00% <b>Bank of Japan Rate Decision</b> Prior 0.50%	<b>Personal Income &amp; Spending (MoM)</b> Aug 0.4%, 0.6% <b>PCE Price Index (MoM)</b> Aug 0.3% <b>Canada GDP (YoY)</b> Jul 0.9%
<b>November 3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>ISM Manufacturing</b> Sep 49.1 <b>Construction Spending (MoM)</b> Jul -0.1%	<b>Trade Balance</b> Jul -\$77.9B <b>JOLTS Job Openings</b> Aug 7227K	<b>ISM Services</b> Sep 50.0 <b>Bank of Brazil Rate Decision</b> Prior 15.00% <b>Q4 Treasury Refunding</b>	<b>Bank of England Rate Decision</b> Prior 4.00% <b>Bank of Mexico Rate Decision</b> Prior 7.50% <b>Williams* Speaks</b>	<b>Nonfarm Payrolls</b> Aug 22K <b>Unemployment Rate</b> Aug 4.3%

Note: \* = voting FOMC member in 2025, **Purple** = Market Moving Releases

Source: Bloomberg LP, Federal Reserve System, U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Department of Commerce, Institute for Supply Management, Conference Board and Wells Fargo Securities

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