

ROMANIA : MACRO OUTLOOK

# Running out of patience

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Economy Romania - Analyses and Forecasts | Erste Group Bank AG  
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Spot Rates as of: September 15, 2026  
Note: Information on past performance is not a reliable indicator for future performance.  
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# Recession, inflation, uncertainty ... what next?

Political instability weighs on Romania's credibility to deliver on fiscal consolidation, stabilizing the debt trajectory and thus its rating. The current account balance remains another major weakness for Romania. Moody's warned in an issuer comment in August that the failure to reach a political agreement on the public wage law 'has negative consequences for Romania's sovereign credit profile' and that the importance of the 2027 budget bill for the credit rating increased. The next rating review is due October 2 from S&P.

Romania appears to be moving out of a recession, although near-term momentum remains weak. We see activity staying soft through 2H26, followed by a gradual recovery towards potential in 2027. After subdued growth in 2025, we forecast a mild contraction in 2026, at around -0.7%, mainly due to weak consumer demand, partly offset by EU-backed investment. Inflation decelerated to 6.2% y/y in August on statistical base effects and is projected to reach 6.4% y/y by year-end. The NBR is expected to leave the policy rate unchanged at 6.50% throughout 2026, while government bond yields should settle around 7.0%.

Overall, the outlook is shaped by fragile domestic demand, persistently high inflation, and elevated political and fiscal uncertainties. Investment decisions will depend heavily on credible policy frameworks that can reduce uncertainty and help restore consumer confidence. Preserving the IG sovereign credit rating depends on restoring policymaking coherence to reduce the risk of fiscal slippage and eventually cap the upward trend in the debt-to-GDP ratio.


The expectations are that a new fully-functional government is soon to be installed.

# Marginally deeper recession in 2026, revised to -0.7%

## Annual GDP growth, percent





## Quarterly GDP growth, y/y percent



The release of the GDP breakdown data for 2Q26 brought no major revisions. The economy stagnated in quarterly terms in 2Q26 and contracted by 0.4% compared with the same period last year. In the first half of 2026, GDP was down 0.7% compared with the same period last year. From the demand side, investment was the sole positive contributor to growth in the second quarter, with all other components acting as a drag. We continue to expect a recession in 2026, with real GDP projected to contract by 0.7%, revised down from our previous forecast of -0.3%. The adjustment reflects somewhat underwhelming developments in the first half of the year. Consumption is expected to remain subdued this year, as indicated by high-frequency data, with elevated inflation keeping real wage growth in negative territory throughout the year. Some partial relief may come in the second half. By contrast, investment activity should remain strong, particularly in the third quarter, supported by substantial EU funds available to Romania in 2026. Net exports would likely make a negative contribution this year. In 2027, we see economic growth moving towards potential and we estimate it at +2.2%.


# Economic growth structure – Strong investment activity in 1H26




On the supply side, agriculture had a +0.1pp contribution to the -0.4% annual GDP dynamic in 2Q26. Industry subtracted -0.7pp, while construction was the strongest contributor with +0.9pp. Services had a significant negative contribution of -1.2pp, with some positive momentum coming only from entertainment activities. Net taxes added 0.5pp. The story remains generally the same for 1H26. On the demand side, private consumption subtracted 2.0pp from the -0.4% annual GDP outcome in 2Q26, while public consumption was neutral. Inventories also made a significant negative contribution of -2.0pp, while net exports subtracted 0.5pp. By contrast, gross fixed capital formation added 4.1pp. The picture looks similar for 1H26. The demand-side structure is broadly in line with our expectations and confirms the signals seen in high-frequency data. Strong investment, supported by state infrastructure projects with the help of EU funds, contrasted with weak consumption, which was affected by negative real wage growth. We expect a moderate recovery in consumption in the second half of the year, which should improve the full-year performance, although private consumption is still likely to contract in 2026 as a whole.

# Flat inflation profile into year-end with upside risks

Annual inflation, percent




Monthly inflation development, y/y percent



August CPI came in at 6.2% y/y, decelerating sharply from 8.2% in July. Core inflation likewise decelerated sharply, falling to 6.2% y/y from 8.2% in the previous month. Before the August print, we expected year-end inflation to reach 6.9% y/y. Considering the August data, we adjusted downward our year-end forecast to 6.4%. We continue, however, to see the balance of risks tilted to the upside. Global oil prices remain inflationary, while the severe drought and conditions in the electricity market are likely to be reflected in upcoming CPI readings. Non-core components have been highly volatile recently and should remain a major source of uncertainty. We continue to expect inflation to stay above the NBR's target band in 2027 and forecast annual inflation at 4.3% at end-2027. The NBR governor said that a rate cut discussion could begin early next year provided that inflation falls below the key rate level. Hence, a February rate cut might be in play. However, given the current macroeconomic environment, the risks surrounding the inflation outlook remain tilted to the upside, and we currently see a May cut as the more likely outcome. Weak economic growth will also be a relevant factor. Inflation likely peaked at 10.9% y/y in May this year and is expected to follow a relatively flat path through year-end before decelerating further in 2027.

## Key Interest Rate, percent



# Monetary policy

The NBR has held the key rate at 6.50% since August 2024, and we expect it to remain on hold this year. Policymakers are likely to debate cutting rates early next year if the depressed demand starts to weigh on inflationary pressure, offsetting supply-side uncertainties, while FX depreciation pressures remain muted.

We see the key rate remaining at 6.50% until May 2027. At the August press conference, the NBR governor provided quite clear forward guidance, saying that discussions on rate cuts may begin early next year, once inflation falls below the key rate level. Weak economic growth also limits the scope for a rate hike, as long as inflation does not significantly overshoot current expectations.

With the neutral real rate estimated at 1.75%, we expect the key rate to fall to 5.25% and the deposit facility rate to 4.25% by end-2027.

# Yields and spreads

Favorable budget execution so far this year has acted as an anchor for RON sovereign yields in an otherwise volatile environment marked by geopolitical uncertainty and domestic political stalemate. Despite lingering political uncertainty, 10-year yields have stabilized just above 7.0%. We expect 10-year yields to remain broadly stable around current levels through year-end, followed by a gradual downward trend in 2027, in line with the expected NBR policy path. The inauguration of a fully functioning government with a fiscal consolidation commitment could temporarily push yields lower. Fiscal outlook remains a key driver and the 2027 state budget bill should be closely scrutinized by market participants.

## 10Y yield development and forecast



## FX market development and forecast



## FX market


The EUR/RON exchange rate spiked amid political turmoil, briefly reaching a new all-time high just below 5.30 in early May. The pair has since stabilized. At the August press conference, the NBR governor restated that the EUR/RON is close to equilibrium at current levels, while noting that the central bank can tolerate larger flexibility given its substantial FX reserves. He stressed that FX stability hinges on fiscal consolidation and political stability.

From a macroeconomic perspective, our models suggest the domestic currency remains somewhat overvalued at current levels, although the gap has narrowed significantly after the recent correction.


The FX pass-through to consumer prices is estimated at around 0.3 percentage points. Hence, it is a very important factor in the NBR reaction function.

# Fiscal consolidation - most important topic in Romania

**Budget balance, percent of GDP**



**Public debt, percent of GDP**



Romania closed 2025 with an ESA budget deficit of 7.9%, a significant improvement from 9.3% in 2024. The government targets a deficit of 6.2% for 2026 and, based on budget execution in the first seven months, the target appears well within reach. The adjustment package approved in August 2025 proved sufficient to realign the fiscal trajectory in 2026, although additional measures may be needed in 2027 and beyond if progress on tax collection and spending efficiency stalls. The incoming government is likely to adhere to the approved 2026 budget, but its medium-term fiscal agenda remains uncertain. Based on official statements, Romania will likely manage to absorb above 90% of the available RRF funds. The 6<sup>th</sup> and final payment request should be submitted by the end of September. A credible 2027 budget consistent with the consolidation plan agreed with the EC would be welcomed by both investors and rating agencies. Rating agencies continue to flag concerns about the political support required for medium-term fiscal adjustment. Romania has a negative outlook from all three major agencies and remains on the verge of non-investment-grade status. Fitch and Moody's recently affirmed Romania's investment-grade ratings but maintained their negative outlooks. S&P is scheduled to publish its review on October 2, when we expect a similar outcome. Assuming a gradual reduction in the deficit, the debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to continue rising and peak at around 68% in 2029.


# Political landscape

A no-confidence motion initiated by the Social Democrats (PSD), far-right (AUR), and several smaller parliamentary factions passed in early May. Since then, the political backdrop has remained deadlocked.


The president is expected to designate a new PM as the decision-making process appears to be blocked, affecting the government function outside of the approved budget envelope and increasing the social anxiety. The most likely scenario seems a PSD-led government with an 'independent' Prime Minister. The new government would face a difficult task to achieve the medium-term fiscal consolidation targets with a minimum growth-negative impact. A government without a stable majority support in the Parliament is prone to political concessions.

Moody's warned in an issuer comment in August that the failure to reach a political agreement on the public wage law 'has negative consequences for Romania's sovereign credit profile' and that the importance of the 2027 budget bill for the credit rating increased. The next rating review is due October 2 from S&P.

## Parliament structure



# Social Development Goals



Romania performs better than the EU average and is making progress in two Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) areas: Affordable and Clean Energy and Life Below Water. While it shows improvement across most other SDGs, it starts from a weaker position relative to the EU. Notable gains have been recorded in Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions, No Poverty, Decent Work and Economic Growth, and Partnership for the Goals, where its performance stands out positively. By contrast, Clean Water and Sanitation, Life on Land, and Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure remain areas of weak performance, with outcomes below the EU average and diverging from SDG targets. Quality Education also remains a key challenge, although some modest progress has been made. Closing these gaps will require Romania to implement substantial reforms across its economy and society, particularly in the context of its OECD accession efforts.


# Romania's never-ending twin deficits problem

From a macroeconomic perspective, one of Romania's biggest problems remains the fiscal and current account deficits. Fiscal consolidation has been well underway over the past year, but it remains to be seen how much of it will be reflected in the correction of external shortfall. Empirical evidence suggests that a 1pp fiscal consolidation translates into about a 0.3pp contemporaneous adjustment in the current account.




# Romania's twin deficits: clear EU outlier under increasing scrutiny from rating agencies

## Twin deficits evolution in Romania




Romania faces a persistent twin deficits problem, characterized by a large budget gap alongside a significant current account deficit. Expansionary fiscal policies, poor tax collection, and strong domestic consumption have increased public borrowing and import demand, widening both imbalances. This situation makes the economy more vulnerable to higher financing costs, exchange-rate pressures, and shifts in investor confidence, highlighting the need for credible fiscal consolidation and measures to improve productivity and export competitiveness.

## Twin deficits (2025): most vulnerable position within EU



Romania stands out as a clear outlier within the European Union in terms of the size and persistence of its fiscal and external imbalances. This divergence has attracted increasing attention from the major rating agencies, which are closely monitoring the evolution of the budget gap, current account deficit, increasing external debt, public debt dynamics, and the credibility of the fiscal adjustment process. A failure to deliver a convincing consolidation path could therefore put additional pressure on Romania's sovereign rating.

## Financing of the Current Account Deficit (balance, EUR bln.)



## Romania's CAD remains large as financing quality weakens

Romania's current account deficit remained large in 2025, at around 7.9% of GDP, despite a slight improvement relative to the size of the economy. The financing mix became more favorable as foreign direct investment and capital-account inflows strengthened. Nevertheless, portfolio investment remained the largest source of financing, while borrowing also increased, leaving the external position dependent on continued access to market-based and debt-generating funding. This composition has important implications for external resilience. Capital-account inflows, largely associated with EU funds, provide valuable non-debt financing but depend on absorption capacity and cannot be treated as permanent. FDI is generally more stable, particularly when it takes the form of equity and reinvested earnings, whereas portfolio flows are more sensitive to changes in sovereign risk premia, interest rates and investor sentiment. Greater reliance on loans also contributes to external debt accumulation and raises future servicing and refinancing requirements. Developments in the first half of 2026 point to some deterioration in financing quality: the current account deficit was approximately 5% higher than a year earlier in nominal terms, while FDI weakened sharply. If this pattern persists, Romania may need to rely more heavily on portfolio inflows and borrowing to cover its external financing requirement.

# Quantifying relation between twin deficits

The results point to a clear relationship between fiscal policy and the external balance in the CEE economies included in the sample. A stronger cyclically adjusted budget balance is consistently associated with a stronger current account balance, with coefficients ranging from 0.13 to 0.34 across specifications. This supports the existence of a “twin deficits” relationship, whereby fiscal consolidation can contribute to external rebalancing. The lagged fiscal balance is also positive where included, suggesting that the impact of fiscal policy may extend beyond the current year. At the same time, the current account itself is highly persistent, with a lagged coefficient of around 0.5, indicating that external imbalances tend to carry over from one year to the next. Domestic demand factors also matter. Higher real GDP growth is associated with a weaker current account balance, likely reflecting stronger import demand during periods of rapid economic expansion. Similarly, higher private-sector investment is negatively associated with the current account, consistent with greater reliance on foreign savings and imported capital goods. Changes in the ULC-deflated REER also enter with a negative sign, suggesting that weaker cost competitiveness is linked to a deterioration in the external balance. Overall, the main relationships are robust across specifications, with the models explaining 59–76% of the variation in the current account balance.

| Explanatory variables / Dependent variable:<br>Current account balance                                                               | (1)                 | (2)                 | (3)                 | (4)                 |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Current account balance (t-1)                                                                                                        |                     |                     | 0.52***<br>[7.94]   | 0.51***<br>[7.82]   |
| Cyclically adjusted budget balance                                                                                                   | 0.27***<br>[7.2]    | 0.34***<br>[3.09]   | 0.21***<br>[3.44]   | 0.13*<br>[1.73]     |
| Cyclically adjusted budget balance (t-1)                                                                                             | 0.29*<br>[1.91]     |                     |                     | 0.16*<br>[1.86]     |
| Δ Real GDP                                                                                                                           | -0.29***<br>[-3.93] | -0.27***<br>[-3.67] | -0.37***<br>[-5.23] | -0.39***<br>[-5.95] |
| Δ REER (ULC deflated)                                                                                                                | -0.09***<br>[-4.7]  | -0.09***<br>[-3.94] | -0.05*<br>[-1.93]   | -0.46*<br>[-1.85]   |
| GFCF – private sector                                                                                                                | -0.66***<br>[-6.99] | -0.62***<br>[-7.2]  | -0.28***<br>[-3.39] | -0.28***<br>[-3.27] |
| R <sup>2</sup>                                                                                                                       | 0.65                | 0.59                | 0.75                | 0.76                |
| *) p<0.10; **) p<0.05; ***) p<0.01; estimation sample 2000-2025; countries included in the panel: RO, HU, PL, CZ, EE, LV, LT, SI, SK |                     |                     |                     |                     |
| Note: Δ denotes the annual change in a given variable. t-statistics are reported in brackets.                                        |                     |                     |                     |                     |
| Source: BCR Research estimates based on AMECO and Eurostat data.                                                                     |                     |                     |                     |                     |

The estimated equation takes the following form:

$$CA_{it} = \beta_1 \times \text{Cyclically adjusted budget balance}_{it} + \beta_2 \times \text{control variables}_{it} + \theta_t + \delta_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

where:

$CA_{it}$ – the **current account balance** (as a share of GDP) of country  $i$  in year  $t$ ;

Cyclically adjusted budget balance $_{it}$ – the **cyclically adjusted budget balance** (as a share of GDP) of country  $i$  in year  $t$ ; where applicable, in some specifications this variable and CA is also included with a **lag**

Control variables $_{it}$ – depending on the specification, the following variables are used alternatively: (i) **real GDP growth**; (ii) the **change in the real effective exchange rate (REER)**, ULC deflated; and (iii) **gross fixed capital formation in the private sector** (as a share of GDP);

$\theta_t, \delta_i$ – **time and country fixed effects**;

$\varepsilon_{it}$ – the **error term**

# Romania: Forecasts

|                                | 2019                                    | 2020        | 2021        | 2022         | 2023         | 2024         | 2025         | 2026f        | 2027f        |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| <b>Percent</b>                 |                                         |             |             |              |              |              |              |              |              |
| Real GDP growth                | 4.0                                     | -3.6        | 5.6         | 4.2          | 2.3          | 0.9          | 0.7          | -0.7         | 2.2          |
| Private consumption growth     | 3.0                                     | -3.7        | 7.4         | 5.5          | 2.4          | 5.7          | 0.5          | -1.0         | 2.1          |
| Fixed capital formation growth | 14.9                                    | -0.5        | 4.0         | 5.4          | 12.3         | -2.5         | 3.4          | 6.7          | 3.5          |
| Inflation                      | 3.8                                     | 2.7         | 5.1         | 13.7         | 10.5         | 5.6          | 7.3          | 8.4          | 4.9          |
| Unemployment rate              | 4.9                                     | 6.1         | 5.6         | 5.6          | 5.6          | 5.5          | 6.1          | 6.4          | 5.8          |
| <b>Percent of GDP</b>          |                                         |             |             |              |              |              |              |              |              |
| Budget balance                 | -4.3                                    | -9.3        | -7.2        | -6.3         | -6.6         | -9.3         | -7.9         | -6.2         | -5.7         |
| Public debt                    | 35.0                                    | 46.6        | 48.3        | 47.9         | 48.9         | 54.8         | 59.3         | 61.1         | 63.0         |
| Current account balance        | -4.8                                    | -5.1        | -7.2        | -9.6         | -6.7         | -8.2         | -7.9         | -6.8         | -6.2         |
| <b>EURLCY</b>                  |                                         |             |             |              |              |              |              |              |              |
| Central bank policy rate       | 2.50                                    | 1.50        | 1.75        | 6.75         | 7.00         | 6.50         | 6.50         | 6.50         | 5.25         |
| 3M interbank offer rate        | 3.2                                     | 2.0         | 3.0         | 7.6          | 6.2          | 5.9          | 6.1          | 5.9          | 4.9          |
| 2Y Yield                       | 3.6                                     | 2.5         | 4.2         | 7.0          | 6.1          | 7.0          | 6.3          | 6.4          | 5.6          |
| 5Y Yield                       | 3.9                                     | 2.6         | 4.8         | 7.8          | 6.2          | 7.2          | 6.7          | 6.7          | 5.9          |
| 10Y Yield                      | 4.4                                     | 3.0         | 5.1         | 8.2          | 6.2          | 7.4          | 6.7          | 6.9          | 6.1          |
|                                | <b>4Q25</b>                             | <b>1Q26</b> | <b>2Q26</b> | <b>3Q26f</b> | <b>4Q26f</b> | <b>1Q27f</b> | <b>2Q27f</b> | <b>3Q27f</b> | <b>4Q27f</b> |
|                                | <b>*average otherwise end of period</b> |             |             |              |              |              |              |              |              |
| Real GDP growth*               | 0.2                                     | -1.2        | -0.4        | -1.3         | 0.2          | 2.1          | 0.8          | 2.4          | 3.6          |
| Inflation                      | 9.7                                     | 9.9         | 10.4        | 6.4          | 6.4          | 5.4          | 5.0          | 4.5          | 4.3          |
| Unemployment rate              | 6.1                                     | 6.5         | 6.3         | 6.3          | 6.2          | 5.9          | 5.7          | 5.7          | 5.7          |
| <b>EURLCY</b>                  |                                         |             |             |              |              |              |              |              |              |
| Central bank policy rate       | 6.50                                    | 6.50        | 6.50        | 6.50         | 6.50         | 6.50         | 6.25         | 5.75         | 5.25         |
| EURLCY                         | 5.10                                    | 5.10        | 5.24        | 5.26         | 5.27         | 5.27         | 5.30         | 5.32         | 5.35         |
| 10Y Yield                      | 6.70                                    | 7.10        | 6.67        | 7.00         | 6.90         | 6.85         | 6.72         | 6.52         | 6.14         |

# Romania: Country overview

**Official EU language:** Romanian

**Capital:** Bucharest

**Geographical size:** 238 398 km<sup>2</sup>

**Population:** 19 067 576

**GDP per capita:** ~EUR 20 000, below the EU average

**Currency:** Romanian leu RON

**Credit Ratings:**


**Moody's:** Baa3, outlook negative

**S&P:** BBB-, outlook negative

**Fitch:** BBB-, outlook negative

**EU member state:** since January 2007

**Schengen:** since January 2025



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


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


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
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